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“Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities 
Hugh Spitzer* 
ABSTRACT  
This Article focuses on the tension between the late-nineteenth-
century “Dillon’s Rule” limiting city powers, and the “home rule” ap-
proach that gained traction in the early and mid-twentieth century. Wash-
ington’s constitution allows cities to exercise all the police powers pos-
sessed by the state government, so long as local regulations do not con-
flict with general laws. The constitution also vests charter cities with 
control over their form of government. But all city powers are subject to 
“general laws” adopted by the legislature. Further, judicial rulings on city 
powers to provide public services have fluctuated, ranging from deci-
sions citing the “Dillon’s Rule” doctrine that local governments have 
only those powers clearly granted to them by the legislature, to the 
“home rule” view that charter and optional code cities have broad un-
specified powers. Despite actions by lawmakers to expand city home rule 
powers, recent court decisions have puzzled practitioners by alternately 
voicing these two approaches in a seemingly random fashion. This Arti-
cle describes the origin of Dillon’s Rule, places it in a national context, 
and explains its longevity in Washington despite the legislature’s clear 
intent to eliminate the rule’s application to most cities. The Article sug-
gests that the zombie-like reappearance of Dillon’s Rule is explained by 
(1) the vitality of the rule as a doctrine applicable to special purpose dis-
tricts; (2) appellate judges’ insistence on picking and choosing from doc-
trines (including ostensibly dead doctrines) to support a case’s outcome; 
and (3) a combination of doctrinal forgetfulness and carelessness. The 
Article repeats a recommendation made five decades ago by former Uni-
versity of Washington law professor Philip Trautman that the Supreme 
Court of Washington should adopt a more consistent approach, one that 
                                                            
* Acting Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author thanks P. Stephen DiJulio, Pat 
Mason, and Will Patton for their insightful comments on earlier drafts and Nathan Barnes for his 
research assistance. Thanks also to the University of Washington Gallagher Law Library’s reference 
staff for their always-extraordinary research and editing assistance. 
810 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:809 
follows the legislature’s clear intent to make Dillon’s Rule inapplicable 
to most cities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Home rule is a way of structuring the relationship between state 
governments and cities so that the cities are empowered “to administer 
[their] own affairs to the maximum degree” with “the right to determine 
the form of government” and “to define the nature and scope of munici-
pal services involving matters of purely local concern.”1 Home rule is an 
approach to structuring government meant to push as much power down 
to the local level as is practicable, reducing interference by the legislature 
or other agencies of state government.2 Home rule is also supported by a 
legal doctrine relating to the formal distribution of power between states 
and their local governments.3 Former University of Washington professor 
Philip Trautman observed that home rule is often sustained by constitu-
tional provisions designed to limit legislative control of certain munici-
palities so that they may “frame their own charters and thereby determine 
their own powers with respect to local or municipal affairs.”4 
Washington State adopted a trio of home rule constitutional provi-
sions in 1889,5 but commentators, including Trautman, have criticized 
the state’s courts for applying a more restrictive approach to local gov-
ernance than the constitution and statutes require6—sometimes following 
                                                            
 1. Ernest H. Campbell, Municipal Home Rule (Univ. of Wash. Bureau of Gov’t Research & 
Serv., Research Memorandum No. 53, 1958). 
 2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the 
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1964). 
 3. Id. at 645. 
 4. Philip A. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 
WASH. L. REV. 743, 765 (1963). 
 5. Article XI, section 10 of Washington’s constitution provides, in part: “Corporations for 
municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; but the legislature, by general laws, shall 
provide for the incorporation, organization and classification in proportion to population, of cities 
and towns, which laws may be altered, amended or repealed.” WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10. Article 
XI, section 10 provides a roadmap for citizens of medium-sized and large cities who desire to adopt 
a local charter governing the form of government. Id. Article XI, section 11 provides all cities and 
counties with strong local police (regulatory) powers: “Any county, city, town or township may 
make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in 
conflict with general laws.” WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. In addition, article XI, section 12 states that 
the legislature must not impose taxes on local governments for local purposes, but instead may vest 
local authorities with the power to assess and collect taxes. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12. 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT F. HAUTH, THE MUNICIPAL RESEARCH & SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., THE 
EROSION OF HOME RULE—THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN POWERS OF MUNICIPAL SELF GOVERNMENT 
IN WASHINGTON (1990); JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR. ET AL., IS HOME RULE THE ANSWER? 
CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON’S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2003/1/01metropolitanpolicy%20richardso
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the narrow Dillon’s Rule, which limits local government powers to those 
expressly granted by statute or those necessarily implied.7 This was first 
pointed out in 1916 by Columbia University professor Howard McBain, 
who published a detailed treatise on home rule in the several states (in-
cluding Washington) that had adopted it in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.8 Despite legislative efforts to clarify and strengthen 
home rule powers, the Supreme Court of Washington has been notably 
inconsistent in its pronouncements on city authority, and this has been 
confusing both to municipal lawyers and to the city leaders who guide 
policies and programs. 
Apart from McBain’s treatise and a supplemental study by Colum-
bia University’s Joseph D. McGoldrick in 1933,9 no account of Washing-
ton State’s experience with home rule has analyzed its history within a 
national context. The concept and its inconsistent handling by the judici-
ary are better understood by reviewing populist and progressive reform 
politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the 
next wave of home rule advocacy after World War II. 
This Article, in Part II, reviews Dillon’s Rule in relation to post-
Civil War American jurisprudence that was heavily influenced by legal 
academics. It then discusses the municipal home rule provisions that 
were adopted across the country at the turn of the twentieth century. The 
Article shows how the framers of Washington’s 1889 constitution—one 
of the earliest in the nation with a home rule provision10—intended to 
confer broad local powers on cities by enacting a local government pro-
vision that was very progressive for that point in history. But there were 
                                                                                                                                     
n/dillonsrule.pdf; Trautman, supra note 4, at 782–83; Robert F. Brachtenbach, Comment, Home Rule 
in Washington—At the Whim of the Legislature, 29 WASH. L. REV. 295, 298 (1954); Michael Mon-
roe Kellogg Sebree, Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 
WASH. L. REV. 155 (1989). 
 7. See, e.g., Port of Seattle v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 597 P.2d 383, 386 (Wash. 
1979) (a special purpose district case) (“The Port, as a municipal corporation, is limited in its powers 
to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and also those 
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. If there is a doubt as to whether the 
power is granted, it must be denied.” (citations omitted)); City of Aberdeen v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 275 P. 
62, 63 (Wash. 1929) (“[M]unicipal corporations have only the powers conferred by statute.”). 
 8. HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 455 
(1916). 
 9. JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 1916–1930 
(1933). 
 10. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 11 (2001). 
Krane et al. list Washington as the second state with a home rule constitutional provision, but Cali-
fornia probably should be viewed as the second. California’s 1879 version was effective only as to 
one city: San Francisco; but Washington’s was modeled in part on California’s. See infra notes 46–
47 and accompanying text. 
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a variety of understandings of what “home rule” meant, and the Supreme 
Court of Washington initially interpreted the constitution’s municipal 
powers provision restrictively, particularly with respect to municipal au-
thority outside of “police” (i.e., regulatory) powers. In the Progressive 
Era at the beginning of the twentieth century, the court shifted to a 
broader view of city powers. Later, after World War II, rapid urban and 
suburban growth and increasing demand for city services led the legisla-
ture to extend the robust local powers enjoyed by the larger charter cities 
to virtually all the cities in the state. 
The net result, as described in Part III, was a hybrid type of home 
rule based both on the state constitution and on statutes. Under the con-
stitution, Washington cities, as well as counties,11 have substantial inher-
ent police powers. By a combination of constitutional provisions and 
statutes, most cities have also gained a variety of options with respect to 
their form of government. Part IV then outlines how the legislature’s ex-
pansion of city powers and the lawmakers’ explicit rejection of Dillon’s 
Rule still met some judicial resistance in the mid-twentieth century, par-
ticularly in the sphere of general municipal services and utility (“proprie-
tary”) activities, i.e., city activities outside the realm of police powers. 
Courts on occasion ignored rather clear statutory language in rendering 
decisions limiting local powers. The legislature responded with an ex-
plicit statutory expansion of city powers through enactment of the Op-
tional Municipal Code in 1967. 
Part V of this Article analyzes a number of Washington court opin-
ions on home rule during the past five decades. It suggests three reasons 
for the sporadic, zombie-like resurrection of the narrow Dillon’s Rule 
doctrine concerning city powers in Washington State. First, Dillon’s 
Rule has consistently been applied to Washington’s special purpose dis-
tricts, although not consistently applied to cities. It is easy for lawyers 
                                                            
 11. Since 1948, any Washington county has been authorized to “frame a ‘Home Rule’ charter 
for its own government” under Article XI, section 4 of Washington’s constitution, and the Supreme 
Court of Washington appears to treat the powers of charter counties similarly to those of charter 
cities. King Cnty. Council v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 611 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Wash. 1980). See also 
WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4. Although many of the principles discussed in this Article are substantial-
ly applicable to counties, this Article focuses solely on cities because the home rule movement his-
torically addressed only the organization and powers of cities, and because there are relatively few 
Washington cases concerning powers of home rule counties. Further, Washington counties histori-
cally fulfilled a dual function, serving both as local governments in unincorporated areas and as 
agents of the state to carry out its programs. And some county powers are exercised countywide, 
while others are exercised only in unincorporated areas. One commentator has observed, “No other 
type of local government in Washington State is characterized by either of these dual natures.” 
STEVE LUNDIN, THE CLOSEST GOVERNMENTS TO THE PEOPLE: A COMPLETE REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON STATE 81 (2007). 
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and judges to misunderstand the difference between cities and special 
purpose municipalities and to ignore the doctrinal difference between the 
law relating to city powers and special purpose district powers. Second, 
when judges desire particular outcomes, they pick and choose among 
legal rationales suggested by the lawyers before them, occasionally re-
viving doctrines that ostensibly have been rendered obsolete by statutory 
enactments or previous court rulings. Third, American common law 
judges are so used to making law that they sometimes bend or altogether 
ignore statutory law. 
This Article, in Part VI, concludes that the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington would do well to follow the rather clear legislative direction re-
garding charter city and code city powers, and as Professor Trautman 
recommended fifty years ago, to strengthen judicial interpretations rec-
ognizing the powers of cities. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF “DILLON’S RULE” AND “HOME RULE” 
A. “Dillon’s Rule” and the Late-Nineteenth-Century Legal Academics 
To understand the development of modern local government law in 
the United States, it is helpful to understand the origin and nature of 
“Dillon’s Rule,” named after John Forrest Dillon.12 Dillon was elected to 
the Iowa Supreme Court in 1852, and was appointed by President Grant 
to the United States Circuit Court in 1869.13 He resigned in 1879 and 
moved to New York to pursue a dual career as a law professor at Colum-
bia and as a lead lawyer for the Union Pacific Railroad.14 Dillon’s influ-
ential view of local government powers was first announced in City of 
Clinton v. The Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad Co.,15 a 
case in which the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a city’s powers were 
limited by the charter granted by the legislature and that the city could 
not block construction of a state-authorized railway on its streets. Dillon 
wrote: “The corporation of Clinton is a public municipal corporation, 
created for public purposes only, and can exercise no powers but such as 
are expressly granted by law, or such as are incidental to those expressly 
granted, and is always subject to legislative control.”16 This doctrine was 
repeated in Dillon’s comprehensive and widely cited treatise, Commen-
                                                            
 12. CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 111–12 (1954). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475, 479 (1868). 
 16. Id. at 461. 
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taries on the Law of Municipal Corporations,17 in which he emphasized 
the “supremacy of the legislative authority over municipal corporations” 
limited only by constitutional provisions.18 
John F. Dillon was one of several influential jurists and academics 
who shaped American public law in the post-Civil War period, including 
professor and Michigan Supreme Court justice Thomas M. Cooley,19 and 
law professor Christopher Tiedeman.20 Dillon’s 1872 treatise on munici-
pal corporations,21 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon 
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (1868),22 and 
Tiedeman’s Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the United 
States: Considered from Both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint (1886)23 
were widely read and repeatedly cited.24 For example, in Territory of 
Washington v. Ah Lim,25 where Washington’s first supreme court nar-
rowly upheld the State’s power to outlaw opium consumption, both 
Tiedeman and Cooley were cited by the defense in support of the limited 
power of government to regulate personal private activities.26 One cannot 
understate the impact of Dillon, Cooley, and other key legal academics 
of the late nineteenth century. Lawyers and judges constantly read and 
applied the treatises by these eminent professors, some of whom were 
also jurists. Dillon’s Commentaries were cited in 104 Supreme Court of 
Washington opinions between 1889 and 1929, and 56 times between 
1930 and 2014; Thomas Cooley’s works were cited at least 245 times 
between 1889 and 1929, and at least 174 times between 1930 and pre-
sent; and Tiedeman was cited in 34 appellate opinions between 1889 and 
1929, and 8 times since then.27 
                                                            
 17. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). 
 18. Id. § 38, at 81. 
 19. Thomas M. Cooley taught constitutional law at University of Michigan School of Law for 
decades, and for a number of years simultaneously served on the Michigan Supreme Court. JACOBS, 
supra note 14, at 28–29. 
 20. Tiedeman taught at the University of Missouri, and then at the University of the City of 
New York and the University of Buffalo. Id. at 58–59. 
 21. DILLON, supra note 17. 
 22. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868). 
 23. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT (1886). 
 24.  JACOBS, supra note 12, at 58–60, 64–65; Edwin A. Gere, Jr., Dillon’s Rule and the Cooley 
Doctrine, 8 J. URB. HIST. 271, 271 (1982); David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. 
Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 98 (1990). 
 25. Territory v. Ah Lim, 24 P. 588 (Wash. 1890). 
 26. Id. at 593–94. 
 27. Westlaw Searches, September 18, 2014, September 27, 2014, and October 15, 2014 (Grace 
Feldman, Marian Gould, Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington). 
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Dillon, Cooley, and Tiedeman by no means agreed on all matters. 
Cooley argued for a local right to self-government and for a less restric-
tive view of local government powers than did Dillon.28 Cooley also had 
a more flexible and evolving view of laissez-faire doctrine than did 
Tiedeman, who was notable for “the relative purity of his laissez-faire 
principles.”29 But these theorists collectively provided the jurisprudential 
framework for judicial doctrines that emphasized the sanctity of private 
property, liberty of contract, minimal government regulation of the econ-
omy, and an aversion to “class legislation” favoring special interest 
groups.30 They also believed that courts should play a strong role in up-
holding constitutionally protected liberties—particularly economic liber-
ties.31 This legal philosophy laid the groundwork for activist “Lochner 
Era” court decisions, which were later condemned as proindustrialist, 
antiworker, anticonsumer, and antiregulatory in character.32 Dillon’s doc-
trine of municipal powers was driven by a strong belief in private proper-
ty rights, a distinct division between the public and private sectors, and 
skepticism of government in general.33 Dillon’s ideology is highlighted 
by an 1895 law review article in which he underscored his concern for 
property rights and substantive due process protections from governmen-
tal interference.34 In that article, he expressed concern about the “social-
istic attack . . . upon the rightfulness of private ownership of land,”35 cat-
egorized the income tax as a socialist seizure of private property,36 and 
                                                            
 28. See Gere, supra note 24, at 279–81. 
 29. Mayer, supra note 24, at 160. In addition, Dillon, like Cooley, believed in the appropriate-
ness of some modest regulations on trusts and monopolies. John F. Dillon, Property—Its Rights and 
Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, 29 AM. L. REV. 161, 175–76 (1895). 
 30. See generally JACOBS, supra note 12, at 26–27. 
 31. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 159–62. See also JACOBS, supra note 12, at 64–65; Louise A. 
Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism” and the Dilemmas of Small-
Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1349, 1350 (1990). 
 32. Well-known critics of the ostensibly neutral character of laissez-faire jurisprudence includ-
ed Roscoe Pound, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Benjamin Cardozo. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of 
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision II: Nine-
teenth-Century Theories of Judicial Finding of Law, 36 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1923). For an excellent 
overview of the late-nineteenth-century academic disputes on these issues between economists and 
legal theorists, see NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914 
(2002). For a modern defense of laissez-faire legal theorists, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 
(2011). 
 33. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1110 (1980). 
 34. See Dillon, supra note 29. This understanding of the limited character of the police power 
was shared by Cooley and by Tiedeman. See COOLEY, supra note 22, at 706–08; TIEDEMAN, supra 
note 23, §§ 2–8. 
 35. Dillon, supra note 29, at 167. 
 36. Id. at 172. 
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argued for only the most cautious government regulation of the massive 
trusts that were dominating the nation’s economy by the end of the nine-
teenth century.37 Dillon was suspicious of the exercise of governmental 
regulatory power over property and viewed that power as appropriate 
only as necessary to ensure that property is “used as not to injure others” 
or does not “prove pernicious to . . . neighbors or the citizens general-
ly.”38 Dillon also took a narrow view of the police power, rejecting the 
idea that it included a broad array of governmental actions for securing 
or promoting the general public welfare. This was consistent with his 
view that governmental power should be limited, and that municipal ac-
tion “is always subject to legislative control.”39 With respect to local 
government, Dillon’s Rule asserted: 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal 
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and 
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those nec-
essarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly 
granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes 
of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any 
fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved 
by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied . . . . 
These principles are of transcendent importance, and lie at the foun-
dation of the law of municipal corporations.40 
B. Progressivism and the Home Rule Movement 
Although Dillon firmly asserted that his rule was “general and un-
disputed,” other jurists and legal academics had distinctly different views 
on the subject. For example, despite their agreement on many legal top-
ics, Justice Cooley took a very different position in The People ex rel. 
LeRoy v. Hurlbut.41 There, he wrote that the State of Michigan could not 
by statute undertake the administration of a city and the appointment of 
municipal officers, ruling that the “state may mould [sic] local institu-
tions according to its views of policy or expediency; but local govern-
ment is matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away.”42 This 
more liberal “Cooley Doctrine” on municipal powers had its support-
                                                            
 37. Id. at 176. 
 38. DILLON, supra note 17, § 93, at 136. 
 39. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 40. DILLON, supra note 17, § 55, at 101–02. 
 41. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871). 
 42. Id. at 108. 
2015] “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities 817 
ers,43 but it did not gain as much traction as Dillon’s Rule, perhaps be-
cause Dillon’s municipal law treatise was comprehensive and accessible, 
and because many judges agreed with him about the supremacy of the 
legislatures as the sole source of legitimate authority within the states.44 
But as the nineteenth century drew to a close, other forces were attacking 
the political legitimacy of state legislatures and urging that greater pow-
ers and flexibility be accorded to local governments. 
In 1875, Missouri adopted a new constitution that included a provi-
sion allowing the people of St. Louis to frame their own “charter for the 
governance of the city,” subject to the ultimate supervision of the legisla-
ture.45 At their constitutional convention, “[c]orruption and favoritism by 
the state legislature in the management of the affairs of the city of St. 
Louis was [a] pervasive . . . theme in the debates” and directly led to 
what was the first of many “home rule” provisions inserted into state 
constitutions during the following decades.46 California was next, in 
1879, with a provision in its new constitution47 meant to “liberate at least 
the metropolitan city of the [s]tate—San Francisco—from the thraldom 
[sic] of legislative ‘interference’ in its affairs.”48 The concept of locally 
generated charters, rather than charters dictated for each new city by the 
legislature, was an important component of proposals by progressive 
municipal reformers who were steadily gaining support and influence. 
When Washington’s constitutional convention met on July 4, 1889, a 
complete draft constitution, written by former Oregon judge and statute 
codifier W. Lair Hill, was on each delegate’s desk on the first day.49 
Hill’s draft included a commentary on his proposed requirement that cit-
ies and towns be incorporated by the electors rather than by special 
laws.50 Hill wrote: 
                                                            
 43. See, e.g., EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 
246, at 558 (1911); Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government (pts. 1–3), 13 HARV. L. 
REV. 441, 570, 638 (1900); Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government (pts. 4–5), 14 
HARV. L. REV. 20, 116 (1900). 
 44. Frug, supra note 33, at 1114–15; Gere, supra note 24, at 294–95. See also infra notes 164–
165 and accompanying text. 
 45. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, §§ 20–25. 
 46. Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51, 65, 67 
(1989). 
 47. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, §§ 6–8. 
 48. MCBAIN, supra note 8, at 200. 
 49. HISTORY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON: WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND BIOGRAPHICAL 
SKETCHES OF SOME OF ITS PROMINENT MEN AND PIONEERS 507–11 (Frederic James Grant ed., 
1891). 
 50. The following language of Hill’s proposed article XI, section 4 is found almost verbatim in 
article XI, section 10, as ultimately adopted: “Cities and towns shall not be incorporated by special 
laws; but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization and clas-
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No one need be informed that the incorporation of cities and towns 
by special act of the legislature is an exhaustless fountain of evil in 
a state where it prevails. There is no branch of government more 
completely and perfectly adapted to the purposes of those who 
make the filthiest politics a trade, than the manipulating of city 
charters when this can be done by special laws. These charters are 
the footballs of all the skilled labor lobbyists, who are sure to be-
siege the legislature when there is opportunity for plunder.51 
Hill’s concern about special interests dominating the legislature reflected 
“populist” views prevalent in many parts of the country, including the 
new state of Washington.52 
As America moved into the Progressive Era of the early twentieth 
century, proposals for locally generated charters and city home rule in-
creased, along with calls for the professionalization of local government, 
nonpartisan municipal elections, the initiative, referendum, and recall, 
and other measures with the intent of “removing corrupt, special influ-
ence from government; modifying the structure of government so as to 
make it easier for the people to control; and using the government so re-
stored to the people to relieve social and economic distress.”53 One 
“good government” municipal reform was to amend state constitutions to 
forbid special legislation applicable to specific cities or towns. In the 
words of Columbia Law School professor Richard Briffault, this was 
intended “to protect the structural integrity of municipalities by barring 
the transfer of municipal services or activities to agencies not a part of 
the local government, [and] . . . to prevent the singling out of specific 
localities for state interference.”54 Briffault suggests that at its core, 
“[t]he home rule movement had two goals: to undo Dillon’s Rule by giv-
ing localities broad lawmaking authority and to provide local govern-
                                                                                                                                     
sification, in proportion to populations of cities and towns, which laws may be altered, amended or 
repealed by general laws.” W. Lair Hill, A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State: Suggestions by 
Hon. W. Lair Hill Main Features Considered in Light of Modern Experience. Outline and Comment 
Together, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 4, 1889, available at http://lib.law.washington.edu/waconst 
Sources/Hill%20Constitution.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 72. 
 52. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Washington: The Past and Present Populist State, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 771 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons 
eds., 2008). 
 53. BENJAMIN PARKE DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN, 
COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 278 (1915). See 
also Melvin G. Holli, Urban Reform in the Progressive Era, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 133–51 
(Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974); KRANE ET AL., supra note 10, at 11; Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of 
Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era, 55 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 157, 159 (1964). 
 54. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1990). 
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ments freedom from state interference in areas of local concern.”55 Be-
sides advocating professionalization of city government and an increase 
in local control,56 progressive legal scholars, such as the University of 
Chicago’s Ernst Freund, argued for a more expansive understanding of 
basic municipal authority, including the police power.57 Freund believed 
police power was more than a narrow concept aimed at protecting public 
safety, order, and morals.58 Instead, he said that the police power “aims 
directly to secure and promote the public welfare” and that “the police 
power is not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, econom-
ic and political conditions . . . [it] must continue to be elastic, i.e., capa-
ble of development.”59 Freund’s broad view of police power gained 
widespread acceptance during and after the Progressive Era, and he was 
“probably the most influential author of the twentieth century in the field 
of the police power.”60 Freund’s approach was shared by other well-
known judges and scholars, including Roscoe Pound, Learned Hand, Fe-
lix Frankfurter, and Louis Brandeis.61 Views of municipal police power 
evolved, and the home rule movement gained popularity. Rights to local-
ly drafted city charters found their way into the constitutions of state af-
ter state.62 But in practice, home rule turned out to be something different 
from what some of its early advocates envisioned, in part because of lack 
                                                            
 55. Id. at 10. 
 56. A good example of contemporary advocacy for professional city management and local 
control of local affairs is found in FRANK J. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 380–84 (1910). 
 57. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
(1904). 
 58. See id. § 10. 
 59. Id. § 3. 
 60. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
745, 757 n.70 (2007). For a description of the evolution of police power jurisprudence in Washing-
ton State and its evolution during the Progressive Era, see Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power 
in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 503–05 (2000). 
 61. University of Chicago law professor Richard A. Epstein observed: “Ernst Freund, Roscoe 
Pound, Learned Hand, Felix Frankfurter, and Louis Brandeis all condemned the rigid and dogmatic 
view of the police power nourished by oft-discredited dictates of laissez-faire jurisprudence.” Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Jurisprudence of the “Pro-
gressive Era”, 51 VAND. L. REV. 787, 790 (1998). Those progressive critics were by and large suc-
cessful. For example, Justice Holmes was able to declare for the Court in 1915 that “the police pow-
er extends to all the great public needs.” Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1915). See 
also Day-Brite v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952) (“[T]he police power is not confined to a 
narrow category.”). On the influence and success of Freund’s approach to police power jurispru-
dence, see OSCAR KRAINES, THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF ERNST FREUND: THE SEARCH FOR GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15–22 (1974). 
 62. Progressive Era home rule provisions included Minnesota (1896), Colorado (1902), Virgin-
ia (1902), Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Arizona (1912), Ohio (1912), Ne-
braska (1912), and Texas (1912). RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
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of clarity of what “home rule” really meant, and in part because of judi-
cial resistance and the long arm of Dillon’s Rule. 
C. What Exactly is Home Rule? 
A 1954 report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission stated that 
“[t]here is perhaps no term in the literature of political science or law 
which is more susceptible to misconception and a variety of meaning 
than ‘home rule.’”63 As stated at the beginning of this Article, home rule 
is both a political concept and a legal concept. As a political concept, it 
focuses on the allocation to local residents of policy choices about any 
combination of (1) the structure of local government; (2) what regulatory 
activities the local government engages in or what public services it pro-
vides; and (3) strong local control over carrying out the allocated func-
tions.64 But the legal frameworks establishing home rule vary tremen-
dously from state to state. In some instances home rule is wholly or par-
tially prescribed by constitutional provisions (“constitutional home 
rule”), while in others home rule is established primarily or entirely by 
statute (“statutory home rule”).65 In addition, some constitutional provi-
sions have been interpreted as being self-executing in character, while 
others have been understood to require the enactment of enabling legisla-
tion.66 
The underlying legal theory of home rule varies between jurisdic-
tions. A few states have been characterized as imperium in imperio juris-
dictions,67 meaning that their constitutions create a type of internal “fed-
eral” system, with the state concerning itself with statewide affairs, and 
with local matters being constitutionally delegated to local authorities.68 
                                                            
 63. CHICAGO HOME RULE COMM’N, MODERNIZING A CITY GOVERNMENT 193 (1954). See also 
R. Andersen, The Current Meaning of Home Rule in Washington, 8 WASH. PUB. POL’Y NOTES No. 2 
(1980) (“Anyone who thought (as some did) that home rule was a move in the direction of simplicity 
in the definition of local government powers . . . was surely mistaken.”). 
 64. Looking at home rule in terms of these political or organizational choices is similar to what 
some observers view as an “operational categorization” of what constitutes home rule. See 
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 11. 
 65. McBain in 1916 observed the wide variation among states regarding whether the details of 
a home rule system was driven primarily by constitutional provisions or by statutes. MCBAIN, supra 
note 8, at 114–17, 658–61. 
 66. Id. at 259, 413–14. See also Brachtenbach, supra note 6, at 299–300. 
 67. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 11. 
 68. For example, Alaska’s constitution at article X, section 1 states that the purpose of Alaska’s 
local government article is “to provide for maximum local self-government with a minimum of local 
government units,” and article X, section 11 states: “A home rule borough or city may exercise all 
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.” ALASKA CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 11. Califor-
nia’s constitution art. XI, section 5 provides that cities “may make and enforce all ordinances and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs . . . subject to general laws.” CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
 
2015] “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities 821 
But the courts tend to defer to state legislatures when it comes to deter-
mining what are “statewide matters” versus “local affairs.”69 This means 
that state legislatures or courts can limit local powers by cordoning off 
certain policy areas as “statewide” in character.70 A few states have 
adopted home rule provisions based on a model suggested by the Nation-
al League of Cities, which grants municipal corporations all powers not 
expressly denied to them by statute.71 The model’s language essentially 
mirrors the Washington constitution’s treatment of police power, but ex-
tends it to all city powers, blocking the operation of Dillon’s Rule across 
the board.72 On the other hand, some state constitutional provisions on 
local government tilt the other direction and make legislative control 
much more explicit.73 Although home rule provisions have gradually 
spread to most states—including many after World War II that cover 
county government74—constitutional language continues to be varied and 
often idiosyncratic. 
One reason for the different approaches to and understandings of 
home rule is that the late nineteenth century and Progressive Era home 
rule movement was a coalition of people with quite divergent political 
philosophies and purposes who united only through a shared interest in 
replacing Dillon’s Rule and promoting distinct approaches under the 
common title of “home rule.” In an insightful 2003 article,75 Harvard law 
professor David J. Barron identified three distinct groups of home rule 
advocates during the Progressive Era: 
1. The “Old Conservative City” advocates who agreed with Dillon 
that government should not promote special interests and that 
high taxes and expanded state or local services smacked of so-
cialism, but who believed that state governments were corrupt 
and exploitative and therefore should have less control over cit-
ies.76 Their answer was to prevent states from directly taxing 
                                                                                                                                     
Colorado’s constitution provides cities with “all . . . powers necessary, requisite or proper for the 
government and administration of its local and municipal matters,” as well as authority over certain 
specified topics. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (2013). 
 69. Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 269, 290–93 (1968). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 290. 
 72. Id. See also, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (providing that a governmental unit whose voters 
have adopted a home rule charter “may exercise any legislative power or perform any function not 
denied by its charter, the Constitution or the general laws of the state”). 
 73. Vanlandingham, supra note 69, at 293–94. 
 74. KRANE ET AL., supra note 10, at 11. 
 75. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003). 
 76. Id. at 2292–300. 
822 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:809 
localities,77 and to move powers from the state to the cities sub-
ject to limits, including limits on taxes, debt, and regulatory 
powers beyond the “traditional” police powers.78 
2. “Administrative City” reformers who concluded that the rapid 
growth of urban areas demanded more active local governance. 
Like the conservatives, they thought that local government 
powers should be limited, but they focused primarily on en-
couraging apolitical, professional, “businesslike” city admin-
istration. This wing of the reform movement gave rise to the 
city manager form of government that is widespread today.79 
3. “Social City” advocates who saw “city power as public and po-
litical, rather than as quasi-private or administrative,”80 who 
wanted to expand city planning, city services and taxes, and 
whose efforts fostered municipal ownership of utilities.81 The 
Social City activists were regularly charged with having social-
istic tendencies.82 
The different goals and perspectives within this coalition of “home 
rule reformers” is important because it suggests that the public at-large 
(and judges) had very different ideas about what these constitutional and 
statutory home rule provisions were meant to achieve or should be per-
mitted to achieve. To the extent that judges remained tied to Dillon’s 
Rule, either by belief or by habit, those jurists might reject the “Social 
City” approach and instead interpret constitutional home rule provisions 
conservatively, often consistent with Dillon’s Rule. 
In addition to the differences in the goals of home rule advocates, 
the language of home rule provisions varied from state to state. As early 
as 1916, Columbia University professor Howard McBain’s extensive 
treatise, The Law and the Practice of Municipal Home Rule, detailed the 
remarkable variation in a dozen state constitutional provisions that either 
                                                            
 77. The goal of preventing state governments from levying taxes at the local level is reflected 
in constitutional prohibitions on state imposition of taxes for local purposes. One example is found 
in the Washington constitution at article XI, section 12, which provides: “The legislature shall have 
no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the 
inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by 
general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such 
purposes.” WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12. Nor may a state tax commission assess or reassess property 
for local tax purposes. See State ex rel. Tax Comm’n v. Redd, 6 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1932). 
 78. Barron, supra note 75, at 2292–300. 
 79. Id. at 2300–09. 
 80. Id. at 2309. 
 81. Id. at 2311–21. 
 82. Id. at 2310. 
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explicitly or implicitly allowed for home rule charters. 83 McBain ob-
served: 
In the drafting of a constitutional provision granting home rule to 
cities perhaps the most difficult problem is that of establishing a 
clear line of demarcation between those subjects-matter which cities 
may regulate and control in a manner that may be contrary to the 
provisions of state laws and those in respect to which state laws will 
supersede the provisions of a home rule charter.84 
McBain also concluded that no state’s home rule provision was “entirely 
clear and unmistakable in this regard.”85 McBain’s observations about 
the differences among states’ constitutional and statutory home rule pro-
visions, and his detailed analysis of the consequent differences in judicial 
approaches, were supplemented by McGoldrick in 193386 and by a team 
led by the University of Nebraska’s Dale Krane in 2001.87 
Both McBain’s treatise and the later studies also demonstrated that 
the difficulty of drafting or enacting clear constitutional provisions on the 
local–state relationship meant that legislatures, supported by the courts, 
would continue to exercise significant control over cities, with the degree 
of control and the details being worked out differently from state to 
state.88 In a 1949 booklet urging action to strengthen home rule, the 
American Municipal Association observed: 
It is evident that [the courts] are in a position to make the path of the 
city smooth or rocky. Unfortunately judges in a number of states 
have taken a dim view of municipal self-government . . . . Unless 
this attitude can be changed, home rule is likely to be but partially 
successful at best.89 
In their comprehensive fifty-state review of home rule provisions in theo-
ry and in practice, Krane and his co-authors similarly concluded: 
Despite the enlargement of local government discretion by state leg-
islatures during the last half of the twentieth century, the actions of 
state legislatures have often been negated by state courts that have 
                                                            
 83. See MCBAIN, supra note 8. The states included in McBain’s study were Missouri, Califor-
nia, Washington, Minnesota, Colorado, Oklahoma, Arizona, Oregon, Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, and 
Texas. 
 84. Id. at 673. 
 85. Id. at 682. 
 86. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 9. 
 87. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 10. 
 88. See, e.g., CHICAGO HOME RULE COMM’N, supra note 63, at 199–200; RICHARDSON ET. 
AL., supra note 6, at 12–13, 18; Vandlandingham, supra note 69, at 310–14. 
 89. RODNEY L. MOTT, AM. MUNICIPAL ASS’N, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA’S CITIES 51 (1949). 
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been reluctant to drop the catechism of Dillon’s Rule. Crabbed judi-
cial interpretations have continued to construe local government 
power very narrowly, even when the legislature has indicated that it 
has a contrary intent.90 
With that background, we turn to Washington State, one of the ear-
ly home rule jurisdictions, to see how the tug-of-war between city inde-
pendence and legislative constraints has gone back and forth during the 
past 125 years, with the courts playing an active, though inconsistent, 
role in the process. In the instance of Washington State, this Article dis-
cusses whether Krane’s conclusions are accurate, and also whether Bar-
ron’s insights about different Progressive Era understandings about the 
divergent political purposes for “home rule” in the first place, can shed 
light on what subsequently occurred in Washington. 
III. WASHINGTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: TWO “EASY” 
ISSUES: POLICE POWERS AND FLEXIBLE FORM OF  
CHARTER GOVERNMENT 
A. Strong City Police Powers Under Article XI, §11 
Two constitutional provisions drive the character of home rule in 
Washington: article XI, section 10 concerning city formation and char-
ters, and article XI, section 11 relating to police power. The first provi-
sion, article XI, section 10, has resulted in significant flexibility in how 
cities structure their governments, without providing clear guidance on 
substantive city authority. The second provision, article XI, section 11, 
provides strong substantive police powers but does not provide guidance 
on the scope of nonregulatory activities such as the authority to operate 
municipal utilities or to deliver other public services.91 
As noted above, article XI, section 10 prohibits the legislature from 
creating cities by granting charters through case-by-case “special laws.”92 
After statehood, the incorporation, organization, and classification of 
cities and towns were required to be addressed only through general 
laws. Any city with a population of 20,00093 or more would thereafter 
“be permitted to frame a charter for its own government, consistent with 
                                                            
 90. KRANE ET AL., supra note 10, at 13. 
 91. For a discussion of the scope of police powers in Washington State and the difference 
between police powers and other powers exercised by cities, see Spitzer, supra note 60. 
 92. Prior to statehood, Washington cities were granted charters individually by the legislature. 
See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the City of Seattle, 1869 Wash. Sess. Laws 437; An Act to Incorpo-
rate the City of Tacoma, 1875 Wash. Sess. Laws 166. 
 93. The population threshold was reduced to 10,000 in 1964. WASH. CONST. amend. XL 
(amended 1963). 
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and subject to the Constitution and laws of this state.”94 New charters 
would be drafted by elected freeholders and then submitted to the voters 
for approval or rejection.95 Charter amendments would also require voter 
approval.96 Article XI, section 10 says nothing about the content of char-
ters and nothing about the substantive powers of cities and towns, other 
than that the charters must be consistent with the constitution and general 
laws. As we will see below, the extent and scope of substantive powers 
of charter cities and other cities was left to articulation by the legislature 
and interpretation by the state supreme court. 
Article XI, section 11 directly addresses substantive city powers in 
just one very important area: regulatory activity. It states: 
Police and Sanitary Regulations. Any county, city, town or town-
ship may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, 
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general 
laws.97 
This is a strong home rule provision, with a direct, self-executing consti-
tutional delegation of all regulatory powers to counties, cities, and towns, 
except to the extent those regulations conflict with preempting state law. 
It constitutes a clear constitutional allocation of authority either from a 
Dillon’s Rule viewpoint (a power “granted in express words”) or from 
any one of the three home rule concepts that Barron identifies as having 
existed in the early twentieth century. 
The exercise of police powers was the earliest and strongest of mu-
nicipal powers.98 In 1889, prior to the shift in doctrine associated with 
Freund,99 municipal police power was understood to mean the protection 
of public health and safety, the regulation of public order, and the re-
quirement that people comport themselves so as not to harm others or 
their property.100 Therefore, in drafting article XI, section 10, the dele-
gates to Washington’s constitutional convention were not doing anything 
radical; they were simply authorizing counties and cities to act within 
                                                            
 94. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at art. XI, § 11. 
 98. See, for example, the fire safety and public health regulations in Table VII of ancient 
Rome’s first written code from 451 B.C. The Twelve Tables, reprinted in ANCIENT ROMAN 
STATUTES 11 (Johnson et al. eds., 1961). See also Spitzer, supra note 60, at 497. 
 99. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
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traditional roles.101 The early Washington Supreme Court was unwilling 
to second guess a city council’s reasons for making it illegal to solicit for 
taxi services as passengers disembarked from trains. The justices held 
that the facially legitimate purpose of protecting the public from annoy-
ance and confusion was sufficient.102 The court also upheld a city’s six-
mile-per-hour speed limit for cars,103 anti-gaming ordinances,104 and the 
regulation of jitney busses,105 notwithstanding arguments that the state 
had preempted the respective fields of regulation. However, reflecting 
late nineteenth century laissez-faire doctrines that were skeptical of state 
or local police power when used to intervene in the economy, in the 
twentieth century’s first decade the court overturned statutes requiring 
the licensing of horseshoers106 and plumbers,107 and regulating the man-
agement of dental offices.108 Shortly after progressives swept the 1910 
elections and the legislature enacted new consumer protection and work-
place safety regulations,109 the court reversed its stance on the exercise of 
police power to regulate economic activity.110 The justices upheld new 
utility regulations,111 the workers’ compensation system,112 and limits on 
women’s work hours.113 The court’s more expansive view of the police 
power was reflected in Justice Stephen Chadwick’s opinion in State v. 
Mountain Timber, where he wrote: 
The scope of the police power is to be measured by the legislative 
will of the people upon questions of public concern, not in acts 
passed in response to sporadic impulses or exuberant displays of 
emotion, but in those enacted in affirmance of established usage or 
of such standards of morality and expediency as have by gradual 
processes and accepted reason become so fixed as to fairly indicate 
                                                            
 101. Article XI, section 10 was modeled on CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 6 and on MO. 
CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 16. Arthur S. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington State Constitution 
(1939), in STATE OF WASHINGTON, 2011–2012 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 414 (2011). 
 102. City of Seattle v. Hurst, 97 P. 454, 457 (Wash. 1908). 
 103. City of Bellingham v. Cissna, 87 P. 481 (Wash. 1906). 
 104. State v. Hagimori, 107 P. 855 (Wash. 1910); City of Seattle v. MacDonald, 91 P. 952 
(Wash. 1907). 
 105. Allen v. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18 (Wash. 1917). 
 106. In re Aubrey, 78 P. 900 (Wash. 1904). 
 107. State ex rel. Richey v. Smith, 84 P. 851 (Wash. 1906). 
 108. State v. Brown, 79 P. 635 (Wash. 1905). 
 109. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting to Progressivism: Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the 
Washington Supreme Court, and Change in Early 20th-Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 
104 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 107 (2013). 
 110. Id. at 113–15. 
 111. State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 120 P. 861 (Wash. 1912). 
 112. State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645 (Wash. 1913). 
 113. State v. Somerville, 122 P. 324 (Wash. 1912). 
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the better will of the people in their social, industrial and political 
development.114 
The Washington Supreme Court’s robust view of state police power 
was translated to city police power as well. In Detamore v. Hindley,115 
upholding Spokane’s authority to require the grade separation of rail-
roads, the court in 1915 ruled that article XI, section 11 provided “a di-
rect delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that pos-
sessed by the Legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its 
exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, the regulation reasonable 
and consistent with the general laws.”116 This strong constitutional dele-
gation of the police power initially seems to have been recognized as 
applying to first class (charter) cities. For example, in Smith v. City of 
Spokane,117 the court upheld Spokane’s complete control over solid 
waste handling and disposal, ruling: “In all matters pertaining to the pub-
lic health nearly if not the entire police power of the state is vested in 
municipal corporations of the first class.”118 In Brennan v. City of Seat-
tle,119 the court in 1929 succinctly stated: “[T]he local police power of 
the cities of the first class . . . is, by Constitution and general statutory 
grant, the same as the police power of the state, except as restricted by 
legislative enactment.”120 This principle regarding the self-executing na-
ture of article XI, section 11 was later expressly recognized with respect 
to other classes of cities as well.121 
Detamore v. Hindley noted that the subject matter of city regula-
tions was restricted to “local” matters, but Washington’s supreme court 
                                                            
 114. Mountain Timber, 135 P. at 648–49. 
 115. Detamore v. Hindley, 145 P. 462 (Wash. 1915). 
 116. Id. at 463. 
 117. Smith v. City of Spokane, 104 P. 249 (Wash. 1909). 
 118. Id. at 250. See also, Shepard v. Seattle, 109 P. 1067, 1069 (Wash. 1910). 
 119. Brennan v. City of Seattle, 276 P. 886 (Wash. 1929). 
 120. Id. at 887. An even stronger statement on the vibrancy of city police powers appeared in 
Malette v. Spokane: “As to matters of local concern, wider powers than those conferred upon cities 
of the first class by the Constitution and laws of this state can hardly be conceived. It seems plain, 
therefore that, unless the ordinance in question is contrary to some public policy of the state either 
expressed by statute or implied therefrom, it must be held valid.” 137 P. 496, 504 (Wash. 1913). 
 121. See, e.g., Hass v. City of Kirkland, 481 P.2d 9, 11 (Wash. 1971). Kirkland was a third 
class city whose fire code was challenged by a developer. The Supreme Court of Washington upheld 
the city ordinance with an opinion that included broad language about the constitutional grant of 
police powers to Washington cities. At the same time, the opinion noted that the third class city 
statute also granted sufficient authority for the fire code provisions involved, so arguably the city’s 
powers in that instance were dependent on the legislature. In an earlier case, Lauterbach v. City of 
Centralia, 304 P.2d 656, 659–60 (Wash. 1956), the court emphasized that even if a city acts pursu-
ant to a constitutional grant of police power, the terms of a relevant statute may circumscribe the 
exercise of that power. 
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has held that cities may exercise police power in areas where the state 
has enacted regulatory statutes, even though the local ordinances are 
broader and more inclusive than statutes upon the same general sub-
jects.122 If the legislature is silent on its intent to occupy a given field, the 
court, in ruling on preemption of a city ordinance, considers the purposes 
of the statute and the circumstances upon which the statute was intended 
to operate. In State v. Kirwin,123 the court recently upheld a city’s anti-
littering ordinance that was tougher than corresponding state law, noting 
that a city regulatory ordinance conflicts with state law only if an ordi-
nance directly conflicts with a state statute or “the legislature has mani-
fested its intent to preempt the field.”124 A conflict arises when the two 
provisions are “contradictory and cannot coexist.”125 However, “the court 
will not interpret a statute to deprive a municipality of the power to legis-
late on a particular subject unless that clearly is the legislative intent.”126 
Even if portions of an ordinance are held void because of a conflict with 
state law, the other sections can remain effective.127 
B. Flexibility in the Form of Charter City Government 
In addition to city police power, the other area where Washington’s 
constitution has provided strong home rule relates to the form of gov-
ernment in charter cities. Although some delegates to the 1889 conven-
tion argued against a constitutional right to a locally generated charter for 
the state’s larger municipalities, the urban delegates maintained that big 
cities needed to be able to frame their charters immediately and could not 
afford to wait for the new legislature to draft a statute on city formation 
and governance.128 Delegate and Seattle lawyer Trusten P. Dyer came 
from Missouri, whose 1875 constitution was the first of its kind with a 
home rule provision.129 According to one newspaper report, he told the 
                                                            
 122. Soc’y Theatre v. City of Seattle, 203 P. 21 (Wash. 1922). 
 123. State v. Kirwin, 203 P.3d 1044 (Wash. 2009). 
 124. Id. at 1047. A helpful discussion of statutory “field preemption” of a regulatory topic 
versus “conflict preemption” when a specific city ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflicts with 
a statute appears at Lawson v. Pasco, 230 P.3d 1038, 1040–43 (Wash. 2010). 
 125. Kirwin, 203 P.3d at 1048. 
 126. Id. at 1049. 
 127. City of Seattle v. Hewetson, 164 P. 234, 235 (Wash. 1917). 
 128. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 723–28 
(Rosenow ed., 1962). Delegate E. H. Sullivan of Colfax complained that under its legislatively 
granted charter, his city only had the power “to abate a nuisance, and then only if in the middle of 
the street.” To Decide at Olympia, TACOMA LEDGER, July 25, 1889, at 4. He also declared, perhaps 
tongue-in-cheek, that “legislators from Lincoln and Whitman counties know nothing of the needs of 
large and prosperous cities. Many of them never saw a large city.” Id. 
 129. The Conventions, SPOKANE FALLS REV., July 25, 1889, at 1. 
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convention that he “had lived all his life in St. Louis until he came to this 
territory, and this system worked well there,” and that “[t]here were 
many things, such as police and sanitary regulations, which cities should 
have, but which the remainder of the county did not have.”130 Discussion 
of this section of the constitution was lively, with delegates voting once 
to retain the home rule charter provision in article XI, voting once to de-
lete it, and then finally reinstating the language.131 The size of a city 
permitted to frame its own charter was also hotly contested, with pro-
posals ranging from 5,000 inhabitants to 50,000.132 The convention set-
tled on a 20,000 threshold in the final version.133 
Early Washington cases voiced the principle that unless a direct 
conflict with state law is apparent, the residents of first class cities should 
be free to structure their governance in any way they see fit. For exam-
ple, early twentieth-century state supreme courts rejected challenges to 
charter provisions providing for recall of city officers,134 the initiative 
and referendum,135 residency requirements for planning commission-
ers,136 a commission form of government,137 the process for amending 
charters,138 and qualifications for city office.139 Later cases recognized 
charter provisions mandating that certain council actions be taken by or-
dinance,140 and upheld a charter section establishing a local civil service 
system.141 
At the same time, Washington’s supreme court made it clear that 
“where the Legislature has enacted laws relating to [charter] cities, or to 
the powers and duties of their officers, such laws supersede charter pro-
visions in conflict therewith.”142 For example, Washington courts have 
held that express statutory provisions supersede charter language relating 
                                                            
 130. Id. 
 131. Rosenow, supra note 128, at 723–28. 
 132. Id. at 727–28; To Decide at Olympia, TACOMA LEDGER, July 25, 1889, at 4.  
 133. Rosenow, supra note 128, at 727–28. 
 134. See Hilzinger v. Gillman, 105 P. 471 (Wash. 1909). 
 135. See Hartig v. City of Seattle, 102 P. 408 (Wash. 1909). 
 136. See Bussell v. Gill, 108 P. 1080 (Wash. 1910). 
 137. See Walker v. City of Spokane, 113 P. 775 (Wash. 1911). Progressive support of the 
commission form of government as a “businesslike” administrative reform is reflected in contempo-
rary newspaper accounts. See, e.g., Commission Debate Attracts Crowd, PULLMAN HERALD, Sept. 
22, 1911, at 1; Commission Plan for Cities, ABERDEEN HERALD, Mar. 13, 1911, at 1. 
 138. See Hindman v. Boyd, 84 P. 609, 612 (Wash. 1906). 
 139. See State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 33 P.2d 94 (Wash. 1934). 
 140. See State ex rel. Mattice v. Seattle, 21 P.2d 288 (Wash. 1933). 
 141. See City of Yakima v. Yakima Police & Fire Civil Serv. Comm’n, 631 P.2d 400 (Wash. 
1981). 
 142. Ewing v. City of Seattle, 104 P. 259, 262 (Wash. 1909). 
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to annexations.143 Additionally, the state supreme court has on several 
occasions held that clear statutory delegation of decisionmaking authori-
ty to the “legislative authority” of a city means direct delegation to the 
city council itself, notwithstanding contrary charter provisions allowing 
for referenda. Direct delegation cases have arisen in the context of char-
ter provisions on labor contract dispute resolution,144 the granting of 
street franchises,145 and the purchase and acquisition of a public utility 
after initial voter approval.146 But the residents of cities of sufficient size 
may opt for a local charter and there “is no qualification or reservation of 
this right.”147 Absent a clear conflict with state law, article XI, section 10 
provides for substantial home rule powers over a charter city’s form of 
government.148 
IV. CITY AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICES: AT THE WHIM OF 
THE LEGISLATURE, OR PERHAPS THE COURT? 
Although Washington’s 1889 constitution provides clarity about 
inherent city police powers and about charter city control of governmen-
tal form, home rule powers with respect to city authority to provide pub-
lic services, and the tools to carry out city powers, have been dependent 
on both statutory grants and court interpretation. The elected lawmakers’ 
ability to wield ultimate control over the exercise of city powers by en-
acting “general laws” is what led Robert Brachtenbach, in 1954, to label 
home rule as being “at the whim of the legislature.”149 But as described 
below, it is the court rulings that have been more whimsical, with doc-
trine fluctuating over time and with some recent opinions appearing in-
consistent with each other and sometimes altogether contradictory. Even 
after the 1967 legislature adopted the Optional Municipal Code statute 
and extended to most cities the same authority as first class charter cities, 
i.e., “the broadest powers of local self-government consistent with the 
Constitution of this state,”150 the Supreme Court of Washington has spo-
                                                            
 143. See State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 409 P.2d 458 (Wash. 1965); State ex rel. Snell v. 
Warner, 331 P. 25 (Wash. 1892). 
 144. See State ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters Local No. 350 v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 
1955). 
 145. See Neils v. City of Seattle, 53 P.2d 848 (Wash. 1936). 
 146. See State ex rel. Guthrie v. Richland, 494 P.2d 990 (Wash. 1972). 
 147. State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 183 P.2d 813, 817 (Wash. 1947). 
 148. Under article XI, section 4 of the Washington State Constitution, charter counties have 
been accorded similar broad flexibility in framing their own organic law. State ex rel. Carroll v. 
King Cnty., 474 P.2d 877, 879 (Wash. 1970). 
 149. See Brachtenbach, supra note 6. 
 150. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.01.010 (2012). See infra notes 230–247 and accompanying text. 
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radically voiced Dillon’s Rule precepts in cases rejecting city actions as 
lacking authority or conflicting with state authority. 
A. Early Approaches to Public Service Powers 
The judiciary’s inconsistent approach to city substantive power be-
gan immediately after statehood. Things got off to a rocky start, from the 
perspective of Washington’s early home rule advocates, in terms of au-
thority beyond the police power. Although article XI, section 10 of the 
1889 constitution had been cast as the basis for home rule in 1891 the 
newly-installed Supreme Court of Washington held that Tacoma’s crea-
tion of a police court in its new city charter was outside the constitutional 
home rule grant.151 In In re Cloherty,152 Justice Theodore Stiles, who had 
firmly supported home rule charters in the constitutional convention but 
who was fundamentally suspicious of governmental power,153 cited Dil-
lon and stated: 
[I]t must be remembered that, although the power to frame a charter 
is conferred by the constitution, no greater intendments are inferred 
from that fact than if it were conferred by a mere act of the legisla-
ture, since, by the same sections, these favored cities are to be at all 
times subject to the general laws of the state. They are not in any 
sense erected into independent governments; their existence as mu-
nicipal governments depends upon the legislative will . . . . A char-
ter framed under the constitutional provision is of no more or larger 
force than a legislative charter, and can lawfully treat only of mat-
ters relating to the internal management and control of municipal af-
fairs, subject to constitutional and legislative regulations. It provides 
officers, ways and means, police, and other minutiae of local admin-
istration . . . .154 
In his 1916 analysis, McBain commented: “[I]t is plain to see that the 
court in this early case was prepared to take a very narrow view of the 
scope of power embraced within the authority to frame a charter . . . .”155 
Several other early cases repeated this “very narrow view.” For example, 
                                                            
 151. See In re Cloherty, 27 P. 1064 (Wash. 1891). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Rosenow, supra note 128. In an 1899 speech to the Annual Convention of the Washington 
State Bar Association, Justice Stiles remarked: “Municipal corporations, with their stores of delegat-
ed powers, are the natural propagating grounds for laws that hedge in a pinch the free-born Ameri-
can until he sometimes wonders if he were not better off to live under the benign sway of Turkish 
Pasha or Algerian Day.” PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ELEVENTH 
ANNUAL SESSION 59, 69 (1899). 
 154. Cloherty, 27 P. at 1066 (emphasis in original). 
 155. MCBAIN, supra note 8, at 401. 
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in 1896, the court held in Tacoma Gas & Electric v. City of Tacoma156 
that it “is a well-settled rule of construction that a delegation of powers 
will not be presumed in favor of a municipal corporation unless they be 
such as are necessary to its corporate existence, but that the same must be 
clearly conferred by express statutory enactment.” Again, in 1906, the 
court cited Dillon in Farwell v. City of Seattle, holding that a city could 
not sell water outside of its geographical limits unless “some statute . . . 
expressly or impliedly permits it.”157 
In addition, the first state legislature contributed to the early judicial 
reluctance to sustain many city powers absent a statutory grant. In its 
inaugural session, lawmakers passed a comprehensive act providing for 
“the organization, classification, incorporation and government of mu-
nicipal corporations.”158 The new law included a section on first class 
cities,159 which included, at section 5,160 a laundry list of charter city 
powers that, in large part, still remain current Washington law.161 That 
statute was (and is) a mish-mash of corporate powers such as levying 
taxes, borrowing money, and acquiring property; public service powers 
such as providing for parks, libraries, hospitals, streets and sidewalks; 
and at least a dozen other general subsections giving express authority to 
charter cities to, among other things, restrain and punish vagrants and 
prostitutes, regulate disorderly conduct and activities endangering public 
health and safety, and to declare and abate nuisances.162 It is unclear why 
the first legislature deemed it necessary to expressly grant these police 
powers, given that the constitution had already directly conferred them 
on counties, cities, and towns. Some home rule advocates soon criticized 
the legislature for expressly awarding first class cities with specific pub-
lic service powers, which, they argued, had also been constitutionally 
conferred on charter cities unless they were explicitly denied by the leg-
                                                            
 156. Tacoma Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Tacoma, 44 P. 655, 656 (Wash. 1896). That case 
involved the City of Tacoma’s attempt to control rates charged to the public for natural gas. The 
above quote was repeated in Benton v. Seattle Electric Co., 96 P. 1033, 1035 (Wash. 1908), a case 
involving whether a city council’s grant of a street car franchise was subject to referendum. 
 157. Farwell v. City of Seattle, 86 P. 217, 218 (Wash. 1906). 
 158. 1889–90 Wash. Sess. Laws 215. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 218. 
 161. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280 (2012). Thirty-seven of the original thirty-eight subsec-
tions of that statute remain in effect today, with only minor amendments. The deleted subsection 
relates to juvenile detention facilities, which are now a county and state function. See generally 
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40. 
 162. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280(20)–(35) (2012). 
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islature.163 Members of the Supreme Court of Washington, however, 
looked quite favorably on “Judge Dillon’s valuable work,”164 written by 
a “learned author.”165 The fact that lawmakers saw fit to expressly grant 
three dozen specific powers to first class cities may have encouraged the 
state’s first justices to apply the traditional Dillon’s Rule assumption that 
cities lacked many powers unless they were clearly granted by statute. 
For example, in 1896 the court ruled that because the first legislature’s 
“enabling act” for charter cities had expressly given first class cities au-
thority to regulate private water rates, the legislature must have meant to 
deny other rate regulation, such as gas and electricity prices.166 
B. The Progressive Era and a New Judicial Outlook 
Things noticeably changed around the end of the twentieth centu-
ry’s first decade, when the progressive movement swiftly altered the 
public’s attitude about the proper role of government,167 and the court’s 
rhetoric about city powers shifted radically. Cases now began to contain 
language to the effect that “growing cities should be empowered to de-
termine for themselves . . . the many important and complex questions of 
local policy”;168 “the constitution grants cities complete local self-
government in municipal affairs”;169 and “the spirit of the Constitu-
tion . . . is to grant the fullest measure of self-government to cities of the 
first class, subject to the general law.”170 Although these cases generally 
focused on the form of city government rather than on substantive pow-
ers, for the first time in recent history, restrictive language about city 
powers disappeared from judicial discourse. In Ennis v. Superior Court 
of Spokane County,171 upholding the Spokane City Council’s removal of 
a civil service commissioner, the Supreme Court of Washington in 1929 
reiterated: “[I]n Washington[,] cities of the first class are vested with 
very extensive powers . . . .”172 The opinion then went on to note: 
                                                            
 163. See, e.g., LEO JONES, UNIV. OF WASH. BUREAU OF DEBATE AND DISCUSSION, MUNICIPAL 
HOME RULE IN WASHINGTON 4–5 (1915). 
 164. City of Tacoma v. Lillis, 31 P. 321, 323 (Wash. 1892); see also State v. City of Pullman, 
63 P. 265, 267 (Wash. 1900). 
 165. Williams v. Shoudy, 41 P. 169, 171 (Wash. 1895). 
 166. Tacoma Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Tacoma, 44 P. 655, 656 (Wash. 1896). 
 167. See Spitzer, supra note 109 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Washington’s 
decisions on home rule issues during this period are analyzed in MCGOLDRICK, supra note 9, at 70–
72. 
 168. Hilzinger v. Gillman, 105 P. 471, 474 (Wash. 1909). 
 169. Bussell v. Gill, 108 P. 1080, 1083 (Wash. 1910). 
 170. State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Court, 126 P. 920, 923 (Wash. 1912). 
 171. Ennis v. Superior Court, 279 P. 601 (Wash. 1929). 
 172. Id. at 605. 
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The rule, quoted by this court, laid down in Dillon on Municipal 
Corporations, § 89, to the effect that ‘any fair or reasonable doubt 
concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against 
the corporation, and the power is denied,’ should not be followed in 
determining a question involving the powers of a city of the first 
class, under its charter, as subject to and controlled by general 
laws.173 
The court reaffirmed this principle a decade later in Ayers v. City of Ta-
coma,174 a case that challenged a first class city’s establishment of a pen-
sion system with no express statutory authorization. The court noted a 
statute granting charter cities “all such powers as are usually exercised 
by municipal corporations of like character and degree, whether the same 
shall be specifically enumerated in this act or not,” and replaced a strict 
construction standard with a liberal construction approach.175 
But in Washington, as in other parts of the country, the push for 
constitutional home rule provisions lost political momentum in the 
course of the 1920s. Reflecting on this, Columbia University law profes-
sor Joseph McGoldrick suggested in 1933 that this was in part due to the 
conflicting concepts of what home rule was meant to achieve, i.e., resto-
ration of power to the “self-called good citizens” versus increased popu-
lar self-government versus a broader philosophy of government service 
delivery.176 McGoldrick noted: “Popular self-government may be disap-
pointingly different from ‘good government.’ . . . The appreciation of 
this helps us realize why the home rule movement appears to be fading 
like all fads. To some adherents it was never more than a slogan.”177 
Notwithstanding McGoldrick’s 1933 view of home rule as some-
thing of a passing fad, in Washington home rule had by that time become 
well entrenched as far as the police power and charter city government 
were concerned. In several areas of municipal law doctrine, however, 
Dillon’s views on limited city powers continued to have a profound in-
fluence on Washington municipal law, down to the present. For example, 
even charter cities have continued to be restricted in their ability to im-
pose taxes,178 borrow money,179 or exercise eminent domain180 without 
                                                            
 173. Id. 
 174. Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 108 P.2d 348 (Wash. 1940). 
 175. Id. at 351–52. The statutes quoted in Ayers are now codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 35.22.195 and 35.22.900 (2012). 
 176. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 177. Id. at 3. 
 178. See State ex. rel. Sch. Dist. No. 37 v. Clark Cnty., 31 P.2d 897 (Wash. 1934) (county 
authorities must have express authority, either under the constitution or an act of the legislature, to 
levy taxes); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Stevens Cnty., 183 P. 65 (Wash. 1919) (a county case holding that 
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clear statutory authority. With respect to taxes and eminent domain, this 
probably has its roots in the philosophy, strongly voiced by Dillon, that, 
as intrusions on private property, these governmental powers must be 
limited.181 
Dillon’s Rule also stayed in place for special purpose districts, 
which, in contrast with general purpose cities and counties, are created to 
focus on specific services or facilities assigned to them by statute.182 In 
1917, the state supreme court unanimously ruled that, absent express 
statutory authority, a port district lacked authority to build a belt line 
railway.183 The court quoted Dillon extensively, as well as its own 1896 
opinion in which it had reiterated “a well-settled rule of construction that 
a delegation of powers will not be presumed in favor of a municipal cor-
poration, unless they be such as are necessary to its corporate existence, 
but that the same must be clearly conferred by express statutory enact-
ment.”184 Two years later the court blocked a port’s attempt to build an 
ice manufacturing plant, noting that “any doubt as to the power of a mu-
nicipal corporation must be resolved against the municipality,” and that 
“the policy of the law has always been to limit rather than to extend the 
proprietary functions of a municipal corporation.”185 Later cases have 
                                                                                                                                     
the state constitution does not provide a direct grant of taxing authority to municipal corporations). 
Although Washington cases do not refer to Dillon in connection with this principle, it was empha-
sized strongly by Dillon in his treatise. DILLON, supra note 17, §§ 604–05, at 575–78. 
 179. See Edwards v. City of Renton, 409 P.2d 153 (Wash. 1965) (municipal corporations do 
not possess an inherent power to borrow money, so authority must be found in appropriate legisla-
tive provisions). Interestingly, in his 1872 first edition, Dillon took the position that borrowing mon-
ey was an implied power of municipal corporations and did not require express statutory authoriza-
tion. DILLON, supra note 17, § 81, at 126. By the fourth edition in 1890, he acknowledged some 
controversy on the question. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS §117, at 182 (4th ed. 1890). By the fifth edition in 1911, he noted, “[T]he author is 
strongly inclined to deny the existence of a general implied or general incidental power to borrow 
money.” 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 278, at 
522 (5th ed. 1911) (emphasis in original). The need for express constitutional or statutory authority 
to borrow is now widely accepted in municipal law. See, e.g., 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.11, at 17–22 (3d ed. 2005). 
 180. See City of Seattle v. State, 338 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1959) (the state, by statute, may delegate 
the power of eminent domain to a political subdivision, but such statutes are strictly construed and 
the power must be given in express terms or by necessary implication). This doctrine is discussed in 
DILLON, supra note 17, §§ 467–70, at 451–53. 
 181. See infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
 182. LUNDIN, supra note 11, at 242; 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 179, § 2:33, at 232–38. 
 183. State ex rel. Huggins v. Bridges, 166 P. 780, 783 (Wash. 1917). 
 184. Id. at 781 (quoting from Tacoma Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Tacoma, 44 P. 655 
(Wash. 1896)). 
 185. State ex rel. Hill v. Port of Seattle, 177 P. 671, 673 (Wash. 1919). 
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used similar restrictive language with respect to ports186 and other special 
purpose districts, including school districts,187 community college dis-
tricts,188 public utility districts,189 drainage districts,190 irrigation dis-
tricts,191 metropolitan municipal corporations,192 and library capital facili-
ty areas.193 In most of those opinions, the court mentioned Dillon’s Rule 
with respect to “municipal corporations” generally, and rarely distin-
guished special purpose districts from cities in general or from charter 
cities in particular. Indeed, in a few instances the Supreme Court of 
Washington continued to apply Dillon’s Rule to noncharter cities194 and 
to towns.195 The court should not necessarily have raised the distinction 
in cases that did not involve first class charter cities. But the special pur-
pose district and noncharter city cases kept the language of Dillon’s Rule 
alive in judicial rhetoric and rationales in municipal law cases, and that 
language had a way of later bleeding over into cases involving charter 
cities and, still later, optional code cities. 
Although the early twentieth century saw home rule gain traction 
with regard to cities, particularly charter cities of the first class, courts 
continued to rely on the concepts of Dillon’s Rule in cases regarding 
specific substantive areas, special purpose districts, and noncharter cities. 
C. Post-World War II: The “Second Wave of Home Rule Reform” 
The continued Dillon’s Rule references in Washington municipal 
case law, and the more restrictive judicial approach to noncharter city 
powers, led to both academic and political criticism. In his 1954 law re-
view comment,196 future Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F. 
Brachtenbach expressed concern about the legislature’s ultimate control 
over cities. He criticized a then-recent state supreme court opinion that 
                                                            
 186. See, e.g., Port of Seattle v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 597 P.2d 383, 386 (Wash. 
1979). 
 187. Union High Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers of Union High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 172 P.2d 591, 
596 (Wash. 1946); McGilvra v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 194 P. 817, 818–19 (Wash. 1921). 
 188. Moses Lake Sch. Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Cmty. Coll., 503 P.2d 86, 90 (Wash. 1972). 
 189. Sundquist Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist., 997 P.2d 915, 918 (Wash. 
2000). See also Kightlinger v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 81 P.3d 876, 881 (Wash. App. 2003). 
 190. Misich v. McGuire, 167 P.2d 462, 464 (Wash. 1946). 
 191. Cowden v. Kennewick Irrigation Dist., 888 P.2d 1225 (Wash. App. 1995). 
 192. Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 826 P.2d 167 (Wash. 
1992). 
 193. Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls, 953 P.2d 1150 
(Wash. 1998). 
 194. Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 304 P.2d 656, 659 (Wash. 1956). 
 195. Town of Othello v. Harder, 284 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1955). 
 196. Brachtenbach, supra note 6. 
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appeared to restrict a charter city’s range of actions and that emphasized 
the legislature’s “right to determine what shall be the law of the state, 
both inside and outside of municipalities.”197 Justice Brachtenbach con-
ceded that Washington cities enjoyed constitutional police powers and 
substantial statutorily granted authority, but he wrote that “the real issue 
is not whether they presently enjoy a particular power, but rather whether 
they are assured of the continuation of such power without interfer-
ence . . . there is no such assurance in Washington.”198 He went on to list 
functions, such as zoning, that he viewed as purely local in character and 
therefore appropriate for local control without the legislature’s involve-
ment.199 Brachtenbach’s recommended solution was a rewrite of article 
XI, section 10 to remove the legislature’s ability to interfere with city 
functions that “are strictly local or municipal in character.”200 Nine years 
later, University of Washington law professor Philip A. Trautman wrote 
an influential article in which he carefully documented the continuing 
legislative oversight and ultimate legislative control over Washington 
municipal corporations, including cities.201 Trautman noted the many 
statutory powers provided to Washington cities, but concluded, as had 
Brachtenbach, that because both city police powers202 and ultimately all 
municipal powers203 were subject to general laws, the state’s “home rule 
provision, which in some states serves as a limitation on legislative ac-
tion, is of no real strength” in Washington.204 He urged that the Supreme 
Court of Washington should “strengthen its interpretations in favor of the 
powers of first class cities when doubt exists and in favor of all munici-
pal corporations when an issue of potential conflict with state statutes 
arises.”205 
Brachtenbach’s and Trautman’s critiques reflected a broader con-
cern with the ability of municipalities to address the rapid post-World 
War II expansion of cities and suburbs in many parts of the country. That 
explosion of growth had led to increased demands on city and county 
                                                            
 197. Mosebar v. Moore, 248 P.2d 385, 388 (Wash. 1952). Mosebar was discussed in 
Brachtenbach, supra note 6, at 297. 
 198. Brachtenbach, supra note 6, at 301–02. 
 199. Id. at 302–04. 
 200. Id. at 305. 
 201. See Trautman, supra note 4. Professor Trautman and Justice Brachtenbach had been high 
school friends and the former encouraged the latter to go into law. CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE 
WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT 1889–1991 
(1992). 
 202. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
 203. Id. at § 10. 
 204. Trautman, supra note 4, at 782–83. 
 205. Id. 
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governments—demands for roads, water, sewer service, solid waste dis-
posal, and improved land use and environmental planning.206 New cities 
sprang up, and many existing small cities faced planning and infrastruc-
ture responsibilities that they had not handled before.207 This post-World 
War II expansion led to a national “second wave of home rule reform” 
that focused on providing new and growing communities with the gov-
ernance tools necessary to address larger suburban populations and a 
perceived need to provide regional governance, planning, and infrastruc-
ture solutions.208 
In Washington State, the continued legal constraints on smaller, 
noncharter cities in cases like Mosebar v. Moore209 and Lauterbach v. 
City of Centralia,210 together with the interest in regional solutions, 
spurred a number of significant constitutional and statutory changes. In 
1943, the legislature granted cities of all classes the option to convert to a 
city manager form of government.211 In 1948, two constitutional amend-
ments were approved: one providing for county home rule charters212 and 
the other allowing the consolidation of a county and one or more cities 
into a single municipal corporation.213 In 1957, the legislature authorized 
the creation of metropolitan municipal corporations comprised of cities, 
counties, and special purpose districts.214 These new metropolitan munic-
ipal corporations were legally capable of providing transportation, water 
supply, pollution control, solid waste disposal, parks, and comprehensive 
planning, all on a regional basis.215 Later that year, the Subcommittee on 
Cities, Towns, and Counties of the Washington State Legislative Coun-
cil216 issued a report entitled Municipal Home Rule in Washington,217 
                                                            
 206. See Barron, supra note 75, at 2325; see also 1 WASH. STATE LOCAL GOVERNANCE STUDY 
COMM’N, A HISTORY OF WASHINGTON’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 29–34 (1988), available at 
http://mrsc.org/getmedia/776D508D-95F1-46DF-8635-938D2D858308/W3LGSC1.aspx; CHARLES 
N. GLAABAND & A. THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA 246–48, 291–99 (2d ed. 
1976). 
 207. MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 483, 503–08 (1969). 
 208. Barron, supra note 75, at 2325–28; SCOTT, supra note 207, at 513. 
 209. Mosebar v. Moore, 248 P.2d 385, 388 (Wash. 1952). 
 210. Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 304 P.2d 656, 659–60 (Wash. 1956). 
 211. 1943 Wash. Sess. Laws 841 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35.18 (2012)). 
 212. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5, amended by WASH. CONST. amend. 21. 
 213. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 16, amended by WASH. CONST. amend. 23. 
 214. 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 804 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35.58 (2012)). 
 215. Id. 
 216. The Washington State Legislative Council was created by 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 36, and 
continued intermittently for several years, exercising research and certain other functions for the 
Washington legislature. See State ex rel. Hodde v. Superior Court, 244 P.2d 668 (Wash. 1952). 
 217. SUBCOMM. OF CITIES, TOWNS, & CNTYS. OF THE WASH. STATE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN WASHINGTON: PRELIMINARY REPORT (1957). 
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which criticized the state supreme court’s cautious approach to local 
government powers218 and recommended that the state constitution be 
amended to bar the legislature from enacting laws on municipal corpora-
tions on subjects that were not “general in terms and effect.”219 The re-
port also proposed a constitutional provision providing noncharter cities 
with the choice of several “optional plans of government”220 and express-
ly providing charter cities with any and all of the powers conferred by 
general law upon other municipal corporations of the same population 
class.221 The Subcommittee’s suggestions were not immediately acted 
upon, but a number of its recommendations reappeared in legislation 
adopted a decade later. In 1961, “recognizing the rapid population 
growth and increasing problems of the urban areas of the state,” the leg-
islature established another committee, the Joint Committee on Urban 
Area Government, to recommend changes in law that would help meet 
the challenges faced by urban governments.222 The report of a blue-
ribbon advisory committee to the Joint Committee223 included a wide 
range of recommendations on regional and local government, including 
suggestions “to improve the powers and finances of adequately sized 
cities” and to increase the home rule powers of medium-sized cities.224 
The advisory committee’s report,225 and continuing pressure from local 
government advocates,226 led to action in the legislature. In 1963, the 
legislature unanimously proposed a constitutional amendment, adopted 
the following year, which lowered the number of residents required to 
become a charter city from 20,000 to 10,000.227 In 1965, a group of legis-
lators, including later-Justice Brachtenbach and later-Attorney General 
Slade Gorton, proposed a further constitutional amendment that would 
substantially strengthen all city powers.228 That proposal did not go for-
ward,229 but the 1965 legislature reorganized and codified existing city 
                                                            
 218. Id. at 10. 
 219. Id. at 12. 
 220. Id. at 12–13. 
 221. Id. at 13–14. 
 222. 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 2511. 
 223. CITIZENS ADVISORY COMM. TO THE JOINT COMM. ON URBAN AREA GOV’T, CITY AND 
SUBURB—COMMUNITY OR CHAOS? (1962) [hereinafter CITIZENS ADVISORY COMM.]. The members 
of the Advisory Committee are listed at p. 35 of that report and included “many leading citizens of 
the metropolitan areas.” LUNDIN, supra note 11, at 147 n.g. 
 224. CITIZENS ADVISORY COMM., supra note 223, at 13. 
 225. LUNDIN, supra note 11, at 39. 
 226. See, e.g., Doug Willix, Council Group Urges Study of “Home Rule”, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 1965, at 59. 
 227. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10, amended by WASH. CONST. amend. 40. 
 228. H.R.J. Res. 23, 39th Leg. (Wash. 1965); S.J. Res. 16, 39th Leg. (Wash. 1965). 
 229. 10 Leg. Rec., 39th Sess. & 1st Ex. Sess. 132, 192 (Wash. 1965). 
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laws,230 expressly broadened the powers of first class charter cities,231 
and formed a special Municipal Code Committee charged with develop-
ing legislation providing “a form of statutory home rule” for cities, in-
cluding those cities too small to qualify for a charter under the constitu-
tion.232 The following year, that same committee, chaired by Senator 
Martin Durkan, issued a progress report to the legislature. That report 
declared that Chapter 35A.11 of the draft legislation on city powers “ex-
presses the state legislature’s intent to confer the greatest power of local 
self-government consistent with the State Constitution, upon the cities 
and directs that the laws be liberally construed in favor of the city as a 
clear mandate to abandon the so-called ‘Dillon’s Rule’ of construc-
tion.”233 The Municipal Code Committee’s recommendations led to en-
actment of the sweeping Optional Municipal Code in 1967.234 
Echoing the recommendations of the 1957 Legislative Council re-
port,235 the Optional Municipal Code enabled existing cities or new cities 
to become “non-charter code cities”236 with the option of using a mayor–
council237 (strong mayor) or council–manager238 (professional city man-
ager) form of government.239 Cities with more than 10,000 residents 
could become “charter code cities” with the further option of shaping the 
structure of government to their own liking.240 To draft the new optional 
municipal code statute, the Municipal Code Committee engaged a lawyer 
from the staff of the Association of Washington Cities—the primary ad-
                                                            
 230. 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1670. The new code provision covering city statutes was part of 
an overall recodification of all Washington state laws. 
 231. 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1798 (providing that any charter city would have all the powers 
conferred on cities and towns under the new municipal code provisions, “and all such powers as are 
usually exercised by municipal corporations of like character and degree”). 
 232. 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 2060. 
 233. MUNICIPAL CODE COMM., A REVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MUNICIPAL CODE 
COMMITTEE (1966) (emphasis added). 
 234. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 200 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A (2012)). Former 
Washington State Representative Daniel G. Marsh, who served on the Municipal Code Committee, 
stated that the Optional Municipal Code legislation “was bi-partisan” and that “there wasn’t a lot of 
controversy” about the bill. He said, “I remember that we got everything we wanted and we had no 
trouble passing it at all.” Telephone Interview with Daniel G. Marsh, former Washington State Rep-
resentative (Feb. 3, 2015). 
 235. Granite Falls Library Capital Facility Area v. Taxpayers of Granite Falls Library Capital 
Facility Area, 953 P.2d 1150 (1998). See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 236. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.02 and § 35A.03 
(2012)). 
 237. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.12 (2012)). 
 238. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.13 (2012)). 
 239. Existing cities using another form of government, such as the city commission system, 
were permitted to retain that form when they converted to code city status. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 
1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.02.030 (2012)). 
 240. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.08 (2012)). 
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vocacy group for cities.241 The citizens’ advisory committee included 
representatives of the same organization, city finance officers, city attor-
neys, and the city managers association.242 When enacted, the lengthy 
statute was described as “one of the least-discussed and least-understood 
bills” of the legislative session, but one that was “drafted in answer to the 
plea of cities for more authority to run their affairs and impose taxes to 
meet their financial burdens.”243 The legislation clearly did answer the 
cities’ plea, because it materially increased the substantive powers of 
code cities, placing them on par with first class charter cities.244 The stat-
ute provided: 
The legislative body of each code city shall have power to organize 
and regulate its internal affairs within the provisions of this title and 
its charter, if any; and to define the functions, powers, and duties of 
its officers and employees . . . . 
. . . . 
The legislative body of each code city shall have all powers possible 
for a city or town to have under the Constitution of this state, and 
not specifically denied to code cities by law. By way of illustration 
and not in limitation, such powers may be exercised in regard to the 
acquisition, sale, ownership, improvement, maintenance, protection, 
restoration, regulation, use, leasing, disposition, vacation, aban-
donment or beautification of public ways, real property of all kinds, 
waterways, structures, or any other improvement or use of real or 
personal property, in regard to all aspects of collective bargain-
ing . . . and in the rendering of local social, cultural, recreational, 
educational, governmental, or corporate services, including operat-
ing and supplying of utilities and municipal services commonly or 
conveniently rendered by cities or towns. 
In addition and not in limitation, the legislative body of each code 
city shall have any authority ever given to any class of municipality 
or to all municipalities of this state before or after the enactment of 
this title, such authority to be exercised in the manner provided, if 
any, by the granting statute, when not in conflict with this title. 
                                                            
 241. Expert Hired to Draft Code, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 1965, at 4. 
 242. Code Committee Seeks Advisers, SEATTLE TIMES, May 21, 1966, at 8. 
 243. Lyle Burt, Little-Understood Bill Called ‘Most Important’ for Cities, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 1967, at 4. 
 244. The first quoted paragraph duplicates the “omnibus grant of powers” to first class cities 
first provided in 1889–90 Wash. Sess. Laws 224, and in 1965, codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 35.22.570: “Any city adopting a charter under the provisions of this chapter shall have all the 
powers which are conferred upon incorporated cities and towns by this title or other laws of the state, 
and all such powers as are usually exercised by municipal corporations of like character and degree.” 
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Within constitutional limitations, legislative bodies of code cities 
shall have within their territorial limits all powers of taxation for lo-
cal purposes except those which are expressly preempted by the 
state . . . .245 
While less than a constitutional amendment to bolster and entrench home 
rule powers, the Optional Municipal Code gave sweeping powers to 
small and medium-sized cities, almost all of which have since converted 
to code city status.246 To emphasize the legislature’s intent to remove 
code cities from the reach of Dillon’s Rule, the new law expressly stated: 
The purpose and policy of this title is to confer upon two optional 
classes of cities . . . the broadest powers of local self-government 
consistent with the Constitution of this state. Any specific enumera-
tion of municipal powers contained in this title or in any other gen-
eral law shall not be construed in any way to limit the general de-
scription of power contained in this title, and any such specifically 
enumerated powers shall be construed as in addition and supple-
mentary to the powers conferred in general terms by this title. All 
grants of municipal power to municipalities electing to be governed 
under the provisions of this title, whether the grant is in specific 
terms or in general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the 
municipality.247 
V. RECENT HOME RULE CASES: SHIFTING DOCTRINAL RHETORIC 
Since the adoption of the Optional Municipal Code in 1967, the Su-
preme Court of Washington has been markedly inconsistent in its rheto-
ric and decisions on city powers. This Article next examines eighteen 
Washington supreme court and court of appeals opinions of the past five 
decades that recite municipal powers doctrines in support of decisions on 
city authority. In eight of those cases the opinion emphasized the “strong 
home rule” powers of Washington charter cities and code cities, and in 
nine, the opinion employed language suggesting that Dillon’s Rule is 
alive and well. In one case with multiple opinions, justices landed on 
both sides. This Article first reviews, in chronological order, the home 
rule-oriented cases. It then describes the opinions that included language 
echoing Dillon’s Rule—again in chronological order. Outlining the two 
                                                            
 245. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.11.020 (2012)). 
 246. Currently, 192 former noncharter Washington cities have converted to code city status, 
leaving only nine still operating as second class cities. There are ten first class charter cities. Wash-
ington City and Town Profiles, MUN. RESEARCH & SERVICES CENTER, http://www.mrsc.org/city 
profiles/citylist.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 247. 1967 Wash. Sess. Laws 1950 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.01.010). 
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sets of opinions separately is meant to help determine whether there is 
internal consistency within each doctrinal line of opinions. As often hap-
pens, in many of the cases discussed, other legal issues were the main 
drivers in the outcomes and the judicial rationales. But they all included 
judicial rhetoric purporting to state the general rule about the scope of 
city powers. What is remarkable is that there has not been a consistent 
chronological pattern overall. Instead, court opinions have moved back 
and forth between reciting home rule doctrines and repeating Dillon’s 
Rule, depending on which approach best assisted the opinion’s drafter in 
developing an effective rationale for the desired outcome. In each case, it 
is helpful to understand the subject matter of the case, the influence of 
other doctrines relevant to the case’s outcome, and in some instances, the 
orientation of the judge drafting the majority opinion. Viewed in chrono-
logical order and listed separately as “Home Rule Opinions” and “Dil-
lon’s Rule Opinions,” the cases analyzed below are: 
 
Home Rule Opinions Dillon’s Rule Opinions 
Winkenwerder v. Yakima (1958)  
 Bowen v. Kruegel (1965) 
 Lutz v. City of Longview (1974) 
 Massie v. Brown (1974) 
 Spokane v. J-R Distributors (1978) 
Issaquah v. Teleprompter (1980)  
U. S. v. Bonneville (1980)  
Citizens v. Spokane (1983) Chemical Bank v. WPPSS (1983) 
 Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1987) 
City of Bellevue v. Painter (1990)  
 Employco Inc. v. Seattle (1991) 
Heinsma v. Vancouver (2001)  
 Arborwood v. Kennewick (2004) 
 Okeson v. City of Seattle (2007) 
Biggers v. Bainbridge Island (2007)* Biggers v. Bainbridge Island (2007)* 
Port Angeles v. Our Water (2010)  
Rohrbach v. Edmonds (2011)  
*Biggers v. Bainbridge Island intentionally appears in both columns 
 
After reviewing the municipal powers approaches of each of these cases, 
this Article will suggest why the Supreme Court of Washington has 
failed to apply a consistent doctrinal approach, at least in its rhetoric. It 
will also become clear that the line of home rule-oriented cases are more 
internally consistent and reflect a more coherent, sustainable doctrine. 
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A. Recent Cases Relying on “Home Rule” Provisions and Doctrine 
Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima248 was a 1958 opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Washington and was published earlier than the others 
discussed.249 In Winkenwerder, the City of Yakima had contracted for 
small advertising signs to be mounted on parking meters.250 Roy 
Winkenwerder, a hardware store owner, challenged the signage as be-
yond the city’s authority.251 The court relied on Ennis,252 noting that “the 
only limitation on the power of cities of the first class is that their action 
cannot contravene any constitutional provision or any legislative enact-
ment.”253 The Winkenwerder opinion, written by Justice Robert Finley, 
went on to observe that the “principles adhered to in [earlier] cases clear-
ly indicate that a city of the first class has as broad legislative powers as 
the state, except when restricted by enactments of the state legisla-
ture.”254 The opinion veered back and forth between reliance on a city’s 
police power over the streets and traffic control and on city property 
management and contracting powers. But the opinion’s bottom line was 
that as a first class city, Yakima had the authority to do what it did, and 
there was nothing in its charter or statutes to prevent it.255 This conclu-
sion was consistent with Justice Finley’s experience as a government 
lawyer, his practical approach, and his belief in deciding cases in order to 
further what he perceived to be the general public interest.256 
City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter257 was decided in 1980, well after 
enactment of the Optional Municipal Code. The City of Issaquah—a 
code city—had passed an ordinance establishing a municipal television 
cable system and terminating the franchise of an existing cable system 
owned by Teleprompter.258 That company promptly challenged the city’s 
action, asserting that Issaquah was without legal authority to operate a 
                                                            
 248. Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 328 P.2d 873 (Wash. 1958). 
 249. Winkenwerder is included in this analysis because, together with Ennis, municipal attor-
neys and judges regularly cite it as the foundation of a strong home rule approach to analyzing city 
powers. 
 250. Winkenwerder, 328 P.2d at 875. 
 251. Id. at 876. 
 252. See Ennis v. Superior Court, 279 P. 601 (Wash. 1929). 
 253. Winkenwerder, 328 P.2d at 878. 
 254. Id. The earlier cases relied upon by the court in Winkenwerder included Brennan v. City of 
Seattle, 276 P. 886 (Wash. 1929); Ennis, 279 P. 601; and Walker v. City of Spokane, 113 P. 775 
(Wash. 1911), among others. 
 255. Winkenwerder, 328 P.2d at 883. 
 256. SHELDON, supra note 201, at 147–48. 
 257. City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp., 611 P.2d 741 (Wash. 1980). 
 258. Id. at 743. 
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cable television service.259 Notwithstanding Teleprompter’s arguments, 
the court’s unanimous opinion, written by moderate jurist Justice Wil-
liam H. Williams,260 held that there was no legislative intent “to prevent 
autonomous municipal activity in the area of cable television systems.”261 
Teleprompter stands as a strong example of “statutory home rule” juris-
prudence based on the broad powers granted by the Optional Municipal 
Code, including a city’s authority to operate a public service not express-
ly granted by any statute. 
United States v. Town of North Bonneville262 was another unani-
mous decision issued the same year as Teleprompter. Town of North 
Bonneville focused primarily on whether a small town being flooded by a 
new dam on the Columbia River could purchase uplands and resell those 
properties to individuals and businesses without violating the state con-
stitution’s prohibition against gifts, loans, or lending credit to the private 
sector.263 The decision did not include any explicit home rule language, 
but it is notable that Justice Charles Horowitz’s opinion held that the 
proposed land acquisition was “sought for the public purpose of insuring 
the continued viability of North Bonneville as a governmental entity.”264 
Echoing the earlier Progressive Era opinions, Horowitz noted that what 
“is a public municipal purpose is not susceptible of precise definition, 
since it changes to meet new developments and conditions of times.”265 
The case has subsequently been relied upon as an example of the authori-
ty of cities to exercise their powers for a broad array of purposes.266 
Citizens for Financially Responsible Government v. City of Spo-
kane267 held in 1983 that no statute preempted a Spokane charter provi-
sion that made a city council-approved tax subject to referendum. The 
decision, by now-Justice Robert Brachtenbach, reaffirmed that “[c]ities 
of the first class are also granted all of the powers that are granted by 
RCW Title 35 and those that are usually exercised by municipal corpora-
                                                            
 259. Id. at 744. 
 260. SHELDON, supra note 201, at 353. 
 261. Teleprompter, 611 P.2d at 745. 
 262. United States v. Town of N. Bonneville, 621 P.2d 127 (Wash. 1980). 
 263. Id. at 129. The constitutional prohibition against municipal gifts, loans, or lending credit is 
at WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7. 
 264. N. Bonneville, 621 P.2d at 133. 
 265. Id. at 130 (quoting EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 15 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.19, at 32 
(3d ed. 1970)). 
 266. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 691 P.2d 524, 547 (Wash. 1984) 
(Utter, J., dissenting); Rohrbach v. City of Edmonds, 256 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); 
City of Bellevue v. Painter, 795 P.2d 174, 176 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
 267. Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov’t v. City of Spokane, 662 P.2d 845 (Wash. 
1983). 
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tions of like character and degree,” and he reiterated that those “grants of 
power to first class cities are to be liberally construed.”268 The opinion is 
unremarkable, but it is included here because the home rule recitation in 
this case contrasts so starkly with the Dillon’s Rule approach that Justice 
Brachtenbach took two months later in Chemical Bank v. Washington 
Public Power Supply System.269 
City of Bellevue v. Painter270 was a 1990 Washington State Court of 
Appeals decision upholding the authority of a code city to condemn 
property outside its boundaries for utility purposes. The opinion pointed 
out that the Optional Municipal Code provided Bellevue with “‘all pow-
ers possible for a city or town to have under the Constitution of this state, 
and not specifically denied’” and that code cities have “‘any authority 
ever given to any class of municipality or to all municipalities of this 
state.’”271 The decision then stated: 
The purpose of Title 35A RCW is to give code cities “the broadest 
powers of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of 
this state.” RCW 35A.01.010. Further, this statute frees code cities 
from the limiting doctrine of ejusdem generis, which requires that 
general words following specific words in a statute must be con-
strued to include things of the general kind or class as the specific 
words.272 
Painter expressly relied on Issaquah v. Teleprompter and United States 
v. Town of Bonneville for its strong home rule analysis and conclu-
sions.273 
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver274 was a taxpayer challenge to a char-
ter city’s extension of insurance benefits to domestic partners. In uphold-
ing the city’s action by an eight-to-one vote, the opinion by Justice Susan 
Owens noted that first class cities may “exercise broad legislative pow-
ers”275 and may legislate regarding any local subject matter unless it is on 
a subject preempted by the state’s paramount interest or meant to be han-
dled jointly, in which event express legislative authority must be provid-
ed.276 After concluding that the state had not preempted the subject mat-
                                                            
 268. Id. at 848. 
 269. See infra notes 315–321 and accompanying text. 
 270. Painter, 795 P.2d 174. 
 271. Id. at 175 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.11.020). 
 272. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 273. See id. at 176. 
 274. Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001). 
 275. Id. at 711. 
 276. Id. In discussing the legislature’s preemption of matters in which the state has a para-
mount or joint interest, Justice Owens cited Lenci v. City of Seattle, 388 P.2d 926 (Wash. 1964), and 
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ter and that there was no conflict with any specific state law or the state 
constitution, Justice Owens recited the home rule precepts that “grants of 
municipal power are to be construed liberally in favor of constitutionali-
ty” and, citing Winkenwerder, that Vancouver was “a first class city with 
broad legislative powers.”277 
Biggers v. Bainbridge Island,278 decided in 2007, is listed both as a 
home rule-oriented opinion and as a Dillon’s Rule opinion because of the 
doctrinal split in the court in that case. The case, which rejected a code 
city’s moratorium on shoreline development, is discussed in the Dillon’s 
Rule category below because the lead opinion of a minority of the Su-
preme Court of Washington followed a restrictive approach to city pow-
ers.279 However, a majority of the court’s members, in separate concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, based their rationales on a broad view of 
city powers. 
City of Port Angeles v. Our Water–Our Choice!280 centered on 
whether a code city council’s action to contract with a nonprofit corpora-
tion to add a water fluoridation facility was within the scope of the local 
initiative power. The decision was based on the somewhat arcane issue 
of whether the council’s vote was a new policy choice subject to initia-
tive, or an “administrative decision” carrying out earlier decisions made 
by the city, the state, or federal agencies.281 The court held that the con-
tract was made pursuant to state and local decisions taken long before the 
initiative was filed, and therefore the vote was not subject to initiative.282 
But in a lengthy footnote in the majority opinion, Justice Tom Chambers 
observed that the Optional Municipal Code “grants code cities broad, 
though specific, powers notwithstanding ‘Dillon’s Rule’ (which limits 
municipal powers to those specifically granted or necessarily im-
plied).”283 Although this language was not at all essential to the majori-
ty’s decision, it provides another example of judicial recognition that the 
1967 code city law was meant to supersede Dillon’s Rule. 
Rohrbach v. City of Edmonds,284 decided by the Washington State 
Court of Appeals in 2011, is the most recent case to rely on the broad 
                                                                                                                                     
Massie v. Brown, 527 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1974), which is discussed infra at notes 303–309 and accom-
panying text. 
 277. Heinsma, 29 P.3d at 714. 
 278. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14 (Wash. 2007). 
 279. See infra notes 340–345 and accompanying text. 
 280. City of Port Angeles v. Our Water–Our Choice!, 239 P.3d 589 (Wash. 2010). 
 281. See id. at 591. 
 282. Id. at 595–96. 
 283. Id. at 596 n.7. 
 284. Rohrbach v. City of Edmonds, 256 P.3d 1242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). The case is also 
known as In re Limited Tax General Obligation Bonds of the City of Edmonds. See also Wong v. 
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powers language of the Optional Municipal Code and on home rule doc-
trine generally. Rohrbach was a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine the legality of bonds that the City of Edmonds planned to issue to 
finance an expansion of its fiber optic system.285 The legal issue relevant 
to this inquiry was whether a code city could provide broadband internet 
services to private sector users absent express statutory authority.286 The 
court’s opinion referred to Winkenwerder and Heinsma, and recited that, 
as an Optional Municipal Code city, Edmonds was “vested with broad 
legislative powers limited only by the restriction that an enactment can-
not contravene the constitution or directly conflict with a statute.”287 The 
opinion also cited Issaquah v. Teleprompter, and noted that the petitioner 
had cited “no authority expressly prohibiting the City from operating a 
fiber optic network and allowing access to its network.”288 Rohrbach v. 
City of Edmonds is a classic example of appellate cases voicing the 
strong home rule doctrine, relying on first class city or code city powers 
granted by the constitution or statute and on previous cases within the 
line of decisions (e.g., Winkenwerder, Teleprompter, and Heinsma) fa-
vorable to broad city powers. But as described next, another line of cases 
evolved parallel with the strong home rule opinions, a line that was skep-
tical of city authority and continued to use Dillon’s Rule language to 
support judicial holdings. 
B. Recent Cases Harkening Back to Dillon’s Rule 
In Bowen v. Kruegel,289 decided just seven years after 
Winkenwerder, the Supreme Court of Washington took a different tack in 
the municipal law rationale it used to explain an outcome that could be 
viewed as restrictive of charter city powers. In Bowen, opponents of an 
annexation by the City of Richland attempted to cause a referendum on a 
city council ordinance annexing a neighborhood adjacent to the city.290 
Richland’s charter permitted referenda.291 But the state supreme court 
held that because the charter city statute did not confer the power of an-
                                                                                                                                     
City of Long Beach, 82 P.3d 259, 263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), another opinion in which the Wash-
ington State Court of Appeals cited WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.01.010 and observed, “[W]e are mind-
ful of the legislature’s mandate that courts ‘liberally construe’ grants of power ‘in favor of the mu-
nicipality.’” 
 285. Rohrbach, 256 P.3d at 1243. 
 286. Id. at 1248. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Bowen v. Kruegel, 409 P.2d 458 (Wash. 1965). 
 290. Id. at 459–60. 
 291. Id. at 459. 
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nexation on those cities, the general annexation statute applied.292 That 
general statute expressly delegated annexation decisions on the legisla-
tive body of a city and not on the city as a whole.293 Accordingly, only 
the city council itself could exercise an annexation decision, and such a 
decision was not subject to referendum because the process was essen-
tially preempted by the terms of the relevant statute.294 The court in Bow-
en v. Kruegel cited Dillon for the proposition that, in “the absence of 
specific constitutional inhibition, the legislature has plenary power over 
municipal corporations,” and that the legislature had full control over the 
annexation process.295 However, the somewhat restrictive reference to 
Dillon was unnecessary because Bowen v. Kruegel can be readily under-
stood as one in a line of Washington cases to the effect that when a stat-
ute vests specific powers in the legislative body of a municipality, the 
legislature meant to allocate certain difficult decisions to the elected 
body and not allow that decision to be referable to the voters.296 
Lutz v. City of Longview297 was decided nine years after Bowen v. 
Kruegel and held that because a city planning statute vested zoning pow-
er in the city council, the council could not delegate that authority to the 
planning commission.298 The court relied on Bowen v. Kruegel299 and 
could have stopped there. But the opinion, by the sometime home rule 
advocate Justice Brachtenbach, recited that it was “elementary that a 
municipal corporation, being solely a creature of and subordinate to the 
state, possesses only those powers given to it by the state and it must ex-
ercise those powers in the manner prescribed.”300 Brachtenbach refer-
enced Town of Othello v. Harder301 for that principle, notwithstanding 
the fact that Othello had been a fourth class municipality and not a city, 
that the Town of Othello case was decided a dozen years before the code 
city statute was enacted and three years before Winkenwerder, and that 
the earlier Town of Othello case in any event had involved eminent do-
main, a field in which cities and towns traditionally had been treated as 
                                                            
 292. Id. at 462. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 460. 
 295. Id. at 462. 
 296. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 308 P.2d 684 (Wash. 1957) (statute expressly 
vested water utility rate-setting power in a city’s legislative authority, therefore rate ordinance not 
subject to referendum); Neils v. City of Seattle, 53 P.2d 848 (Wash. 1936) (decision to grant fran-
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 297. Lutz v. City of Longview, 520 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1974). 
 298. Id. at 1377. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 1376. 
 301. Town of Othello v. Harder, 284 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1955). 
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subject to strict statutory dictates.302 The outcome in Lutz v. Longview 
may have been correct, but with respect to the general question of city 
powers, the opinion included reasoning and citations that were neither on 
point nor necessary. 
Massie v. Brown,303 decided soon after Lutz v. Longview, involved 
the City of Seattle’s decision to bring municipal court warrant servers 
into its civil service system. Massie looked back to In re Cloherty, the 
1891 case where the court held that just because Seattle had a charter did 
not mean that the city had authority to create a police court.304 The Mass-
ie opinion was written by Justice Finley, the author of Winkenwerder and 
someone comfortable with the principles of home rule.305 Finley simply 
could have relied on In re Cloherty or on other decisions that focused on 
the independence of the courts.306 But it was two more years before the 
Washington court would fully articulate a separation of powers doctrine 
on judicial independence,307 so Finley searched for a rationale in munici-
pal law. He referenced Neils v. Seattle and Bowen v. Kruegel, and ap-
plied the concept that “at least when the interest of the state is paramount 
to or joint with that of the municipal corporation, the municipal corpora-
tion has no power to act absent a delegation from the legislature.”308 Fin-
ley reasoned that because courts can be created only by the legislature, 
they were under the state’s paramount or joint control, and therefore the 
municipal courts could be regulated by cities only when and to the extent 
the legislature has delegated that power to them.309 
City of Spokane v. J-R Distributors310 was the next Supreme Court 
of Washington case that took a constrained view of city powers—but 
again in the context of a potential incursion into the judicial branch. A 
Spokane ordinance had established a detailed procedure for abating 
“moral nuisances” such as those perceived to exist at J-R Distributors’ 
adult bookstores.311 In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Floyd 
Hicks, the court said that while “within its sphere, a city’s power to enact 
police power regulations is extensive[,] . . . it is generally agreed that the 
                                                            
 302. See Ennis v. Superior Court, 279 P. 601 (Wash. 1929). 
 303. Massie v. Brown, 527 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1974). 
 304. See id.; see also In re Cloherty, 27 P. 1064 (Wash. 1891). 
 305. See supra notes 248–256 and accompanying text. 
 306. State ex rel. Foster-Wyman v. Superior Court, 267 P. 770 (Wash. 1928) (Washington 
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thority to order adequate funding if necessary to ensure the proper operation of the courts). 
 308. Massie, 527 P.2d at 477. 
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 310. City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 585 P.2d 784 (Wash. 1978). 
 311. Id. at 785. 
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power does not extend to matters of judicial practice and procedure.”312 
As in Massie v. Brown, the opinion could have simply based its reason-
ing on separation of powers and judicial independence, or on its conclu-
sion that court jurisdiction and procedure is a clear matter of statewide 
concern and therefore any city regulation of that must be expressly au-
thorized by the legislature.313 But Justice Hicks added a quote from a 
general municipal law treatise on the limited powers of municipal corpo-
rations in general, and the Dillon’s Rule precept that municipal “authori-
ty must be found either in an express grant or by necessary implication 
from such a grant.”314 
Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System,315 de-
cided in 1983, involved the multi-billion dollar municipal bond default 
by an electrical power consortium of four Washington cities and nineteen 
special purpose districts. In Chemical Bank, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that the Washington cities and utility districts had lacked ad-
equate authority when they entered into contracts with the Supply Sys-
tem to purchase energy generated by three unbuilt nuclear plants.316 The 
narrow holding in Chemical Bank stated that while Washington cities 
and districts had express statutory authority to purchase electrical power, 
the legislature had not granted them sufficient authority to agree in ad-
vance to make payments regardless of whether the promised energy was 
ever produced.317 
The Chemical Bank decision has been criticized as having been 
“strained,” “intellectually dishonest,” and result-oriented in order to free 
publicly owned utilities from what had turned out to be a very bad bar-
gain.318 Whether or not those criticisms are valid, for purposes of this 
Article, the case is notable because its analysis grouped the charter and 
code cities together with the special purpose districts in a restrictive ap-
proach to municipal powers. It is also notable because the opinion’s au-
thor was none other than Justice Robert Brachtenbach, who during his 
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earlier career had been an ardent advocate for city home rule. In response 
to the argument that charter and code cities had a broad array of powers, 
Brachtenbach asserted that home rule powers in Washington are con-
strued narrowly, and that when the state has a paramount or joint interest 
in a subject matter area, an express delegation of authority from the leg-
islature is necessary.319 Brachtenbach concluded that joint municipal de-
velopment of electrical energy was something that the state was “vitally 
interested in” so that express legislative authorization was required.320 In 
a lively dissent, Justice Robert Utter criticized Brachtenbach’s opinion 
because it “place[ed] constraints on municipalities not intended by the 
legislature,” adding that local governments “must be given the freedom 
and flexibility to use all advisable means” to provide electric power.321 
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City of Tacoma,322 decided three 
years later, represented Justice Utter’s attempt to counteract Chemical 
Bank’s restrictive language about municipal (or at least city) powers. But 
in terms of home rule doctrine, Utter’s approach to the case represents a 
mixed result. Tacoma v. Taxpayers was a declaratory judgment action 
brought by Tacoma and Seattle, both charter cities, to determine whether 
their electric utilities could install energy conservation devices in com-
mercial and industrial buildings without running afoul of the state consti-
tution’s ban on gifts of public funds.323 Most of the opinion dealt with 
that constitutional issue and why energy conservation was the equivalent 
of the acquisition of electricity. But Utter quoted Dillon’s Rule as applied 
in a Washington port district case,324 followed by the observation that 
Dillon had recognized that “the rule of strict construction does not apply 
to the mode or means a municipal corporation uses to carry out its grant 
of power.”325 This could be interpreted as being “home rule supportive.” 
But Utter then drew from another doctrinal area—the perplexing distinc-
tion between “governmental” and “proprietary” powers326—to support 
the two cities’ energy conservation program. Quoting primarily from 
special purpose district cases, he noted that when “a governmental func-
tion is involved, less opportunity exists for invoking the doctrines of lib-
                                                            
 319. Chem. Bank, 666 P.2d at 340. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 348–50. 
 322. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 743 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1987). 
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eral construction and of implied powers.”327 He also quoted Dillon to the 
effect that courts are less likely to interfere with the manner in which 
proprietary functions are carried out than they would be if a “governmen-
tal function” were involved.328 
Utter’s Tacoma v. Taxpayers opinion, in which Brachtenbach and 
three other justices concurred, methodically narrowed the holding of 
Chemical Bank329 and helped restore some of the day-to-day flexibility 
that Washington’s municipal utilities had lost in the Chemical Bank deci-
sion. But it did so at the expense of reciting Dillon’s Rule, and it did 
nothing to counteract the notion that, outside of proprietary utility func-
tions, Dillon’s Rule might still be applicable to Washington charter cit-
ies. 
Employco Personnel Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle330 involved a 
City of Seattle electric rate ordinance providing that the city would not 
be liable to customers for damages resulting from the interruption of 
power. The Supreme Court of Washington, in 1991, held that the ordi-
nance conflicted with a state utility statute that made utilities liable for 
certain acts that cause damage.331 But in his reasoning, Justice Charles Z. 
Smith drew upon special purpose district cases and early city cases, re-
peating the Dillon’s Rule statement that a “municipal corporation is lim-
ited in its powers to those necessarily or fairly implied. . . . If there is a 
doubt as to whether the power is granted, it must be denied.”332 
Arborwood v. City of Kennewick,333 decided in 2004, held that a 
code city’s ambulance charge to residents was neither a valid excise tax 
nor a valid fee under applicable statutes. The core issues in the case re-
lated to police powers versus proprietary powers, and the difference be-
tween taxes and fees.334 But in response to an amicus argument from the 
Association of Washington Cities that a code city had substantial implied 
powers to carry out authority vested by a state ambulance statute, Justice 
Barbara Madsen cited Tacoma v. Taxpayers and repeated the Dillon’s 
Rule precept, i.e., that “[a]s a municipal corporation, Kennewick’s au-
thority is limited to those powers expressly granted and to powers neces-
                                                            
 327. City of Tacoma, 743 P.2d at 800. 
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 329. Id. at 802–04. 
 330. Employco Pers. Servs, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 817 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1991). 
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sary or fairly implied. . . . [I]f there is a doubt as to whether the power is 
granted, it must be denied.”335 
Okeson v. City of Seattle336 was a five-to-four ruling in 2007 that a 
charter city’s electric utility was without sufficient authority to make 
payments to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions. Justice Gerry Alex-
ander’s majority opinion focused on the asserted difference between pro-
prietary and general governmental powers, and reasoned that actions to 
combat global warming were a “general governmental” activity rather 
than a proper utility activity.337 Applying an approach similar to that used 
in Chemical Bank, he read the statutory grant of electric utility authority 
in a narrow fashion, concluding that there was insufficient statutory au-
thorization for the offset payments.338 Justice Alexander’s opinion also 
voiced Dillon’s Rule, reciting that a “municipal corporation is limited in 
its powers to those granted in express words, or to those necessarily or 
fairly implied.”339 
Biggers v. Bainbridge Island340 in 2007 rejected a code city’s mora-
torium on shoreline development. The “lead” opinion, by the politically 
conservative Justice Jim Johnson,341 was concurred in by only three other 
justices. Johnson rejected the moratorium on the grounds that it conflict-
ed with the state’s Shorelines Management Act by prohibiting what state 
law permitted,342 adding that the “court has frequently held that local 
governments possess only those powers expressly delegated or found by 
necessary implication.”343 Justice Mary Fairhurst dissented on the 
grounds that the moratorium was a proper exercise of a city’s police 
power.344 Four members of the court signed an opinion by Justice Tom 
Chambers that emphasized the vitality of a city’s police power, asserted 
that this was a local regulatory matter in which the state and the city 
                                                            
 335. Id. at 225. 
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shared authority, but concluded that in this specific instance the city’s 
moratorium was not reasonable because it was, in effect, a permanent 
ban on the issuance of building permits on the shoreline.345 It is signifi-
cant that a majority of the court rejected the lead opinion’s restrictive 
approach to city powers. 
VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE HOME RULE DOCTRINE IN  
WASHINGTON STATE 
A. What the Judges Said and What They Did 
When evaluating the judiciary’s apparent “ping pong” approach to 
the doctrine of city powers over the past five decades, it is helpful to dis-
tinguish between the municipal law rhetoric the judges chose to use, and 
what doctrines they actually relied on (or needed to rely on) to reach the 
results in these cases. 
It is fair to say that the home rule-oriented opinions represent a con-
sistent line of doctrine, based on constitutional and statutory delegations 
of authority to first class and code cities, with each opinion systematical-
ly building on its predecessors back to Ennis in 1929. The recognition of 
broad city powers—exercisable unless clearly circumscribed by the leg-
islature—was a core element of the reasoning in Winkenwerder, Is-
saquah v. Teleprompter, Bellevue v. Painter, Heinsma v. Vancouver, 
Rohrbach v. Edmonds, and in the positions that a majority of the justices 
took in Biggers v. Bainbridge Island. In each of those cases, the Ennis 
court’s conclusion was a prerequisite to the holding, i.e., that first class 
(and later code) cities “are vested with very extensive powers” and that 
Dillon’s Rule did not apply.346 
In contrast, most of the opinions during the same period that recited 
Dillon’s Rule in the context of city powers did not do so as a key element 
in the reasoning necessary to reach the case’s outcome. In other words, 
what the judges said about municipal powers in each of those cases was 
not required to sustain what they did. The outcomes in Bowen v. Kruegel 
and Lutz v. City of Longview were based on the doctrine that when a stat-
ute expressly delegates specific responsibilities to the city council, only 
that council may exercise those powers, which cannot be further delegat-
ed. Chemical Bank, Employco Personnel Services, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
and the lead opinion in Biggers v. Bainbridge Island, were similarly 
based on legislative supremacy over city actions that conflicted with 
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statutory language—although Chemical Bank addressed a potpourri of 
other issues as well. The decisions in Massie v. Brown and Spokane v. J-
R Distributors were driven by the concept of protecting judicial inde-
pendence, and their language about limited city powers must be under-
stood in that context. Arborwood v. Kennewick and Okeson v. City of 
Seattle were based primarily on the distinction between taxes and fees. 
Arborwood also relied on the distinction between proprietary powers and 
governmental powers, as did Tacoma v. Taxpayers. In none of these cas-
es was the Dillon’s Rule doctrine of limited municipal powers at all nec-
essary to build a coherent legal rationale for the outcome. In other words, 
in those cases, the continued use of Dillon’s Rule language represents 
unnecessary dicta as much as it represents the “crabbed judicial interpre-
tations” that Krane has criticized.347 Or to the extent a Dillon principle 
was still applicable, it was the universally accepted principle that when a 
city action conflicts either with the state constitution or a contrary statute, 
that action is invalid. 
B. Where Are We Now? 
How are we to understand the last 125 years of city home rule law 
in Washington, and how can we determine what that constitutional, statu-
tory, and court-made law is or should be today? It is helpful to analyze 
the question within each of those three categories. 
Constitutionally, Washington is best thought of as a hybrid home 
rule state, with certain powers vested in cities by the constitution and 
other powers dependent on a legislative grant. At the same time, Wash-
ington should be considered a “Dillon’s Rule state” for its special pur-
pose districts, noncharter counties, and the state’s nine noncode cities 
and sixty-nine towns.348 The state constitution’s drafters intentionally 
rejected the earlier practice of legislature-granted city charters, and first 
class charter cities were given great flexibility in how they structure 
themselves, consistent with state law.349 This means that the legislature 
must affirmatively act if it desires to constrain charter city choices about 
structure or process matters.350 Under the state constitution, the form of 
government in other classes of cities and towns must be prescribed by 
statute.351 At the same time, all cities have constitutionally granted police 
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powers equivalent to those of the state—again, so long as the exercise of 
those powers does not conflict with general laws.352 The constitution is 
silent with respect to other types of city powers, i.e., the power to pro-
vide various public services. 
Statutorily, we have seen an important change during the past 125 
years. Immediately after statehood, the legislature enacted detailed stat-
utes granting specific powers to various classes of cities, including posi-
tive grants of police power that were unnecessary from a constitutional 
standpoint.353 The significant adjustment came in 1967, when the legisla-
ture, at the request of city advocates, enabled all cities to bring them-
selves under the Optional Municipal Code.354 That comprehensive statute 
gave cities several choices regarding form of government, and most im-
portantly, vested code cities with “all powers possible for a city or town 
to have under the Constitution of this state, and not specifically denied to 
code cities by law,” including, among other things, the power to provide 
“local social, cultural, recreational, educational, governmental, or corpo-
rate services,” including utility services commonly rendered by cities.355 
First class cities, earlier, in 1965, had been expressly granted the same 
broad statutory powers as any other classes of cities and towns.356 
McBain’s 1916 summary of the statutory status of home rule in Wash-
ington remains an accurate depiction, i.e., the constitution gives the legis-
lature great control over cities through “general law,” and thus, home 
rule “has been and is more largely a matter of legislative grace than of 
constitutional right.”357 But at the same time, McBain accurately ob-
served that home rule in the state remained vibrant “due to the liberal 
practice of the legislature in conferring powers and in refraining from 
occupying fields of municipal control.”358 
While the constitutional and statutory framework for Washington 
city powers is relatively straightforward, judge-made law has been much 
less so. As described above,359 the Supreme Court of Washington first 
took a narrow view of city powers—perhaps out of habit and its familiar-
ity with Dillon’s Rule. This may also have been because, to the extent 
the Washington State Constitution was intended to promote home rule, 
the early justices were sympathetic to what Barron labels the “Old Con-
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servative City” approach to local independence, i.e., despite local control 
of form of government, substantive municipal powers should continue to 
be limited.360 Then, as progressive attitudes gained ascendance around 
1910, court rhetoric rapidly changed. By 1929, the court was expressly 
taking the position that Dillon’s Rule “should not be followed in deter-
mining a question involving the powers of a city of the first class.”361 But 
after World War II the court again issued some narrow rulings on city 
powers,362 and in response to that and lobbying by city advocates, the 
legislature materially strengthened city powers in 1965 and 1967.363 Stat-
utory home rule was now firmly in place, with both first class and charter 
cities expressly granted all local powers not in conflict with general laws, 
and the legislature expressly instructed that those powers were to be “lib-
erally construed.”364 After enactment of the Optional Municipal Code, 
the best understanding of both charter and code city powers is that each 
of those categories of cities has (1) strong constitutional police power 
except to the extent a city enactment conflicts with general state law, 
plus (2) “all the powers possible for a city or town to have . . . and not 
specifically denied . . . by law,”365 including without limitation the broad 
laundry lists of powers spelled out in Washington Revised Code 
§ 35.22.280 and § 35A.11.020. Furthermore, the Optional Municipal 
Code has, by statute,366 extended to code cities the Supreme Court of 
Washington’s 1929 pronouncement that Dillon’s Rule is inapplicable to 
first class charter cities.367 Nevertheless, as described above, the Supreme 
Court of Washington has sporadically resurrected Dillon’s Rule in cases 
relating to first class and charter cities, allowing that doctrine to occa-
sionally reappear as a sort of “zombie jurisprudence.” 
The persistence of Dillon’s Rule rhetoric in Washington’s Supreme 
Court opinions is puzzling, but it can be explained in at least three ways 
that relate to how common law works in the United States. First, as noted 
above, Dillon’s Rule does continue to apply to special purpose districts. 
The lack of express anti-Dillon’s Rule language in their statutes arguably 
means that the rule still applies to second class cities, to towns, and to 
noncharter counties, except regarding the police power, which all cities, 
towns, and counties possess in the constitutionally granted “strong” form 
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of police power.368 This means that the Dillon’s Rule doctrine limiting 
the powers of “municipalities” lives on in judicial discourse. Because 
cities are a type of “municipality,” it is very easy for lawyers and judges 
to misunderstand, or ignore, the vast doctrinal difference between the law 
relating to city powers and special purpose district powers in Washington 
State. This is the likely explanation for the use of restrictive Dillon’s 
Rule language in most of the Dillon’s Rule opinions discussed immedi-
ately above, where the outcomes could have been easily reached on other 
grounds without any reference to a supposed doctrine of limited city 
powers. 
The second reason is related to the first, and has to do with one of 
the peculiarities of the process of judge-made common law. Attorneys 
try to win cases by citing cases that appear to support the outcome they 
wish to achieve. Judges cite cases, or jingles from cases, when it helps 
support a rationale for the outcome they think is just. But from time to 
time lawyers and judges will call upon doctrines that appear legitimate 
on their face, but which are simply not consistent with the developed 
doctrine in a particular area. This can be ascribed to a strong desire to 
reach desired conclusions, or to carelessness. Either or both of these fac-
tors were at play in Chemical Bank, Employco Personnel Services, Inc. v. 
City of Seattle, and the lead opinion in Biggers v. Bainbridge Island. 
Finally, many American common law judges are so used to making 
law that they are prone to bend or altogether ignore statutory law. This 
might explain why judges are comfortable drawing upon previous cases 
to support what they think “the law” is or should be, despite clear statutes 
that are meant to supersede these common law doctrines. If a judge is 
personally convinced that Dillon’s Rule is still good law for municipali-
ties—including cities—then that judge might ignore contradictory provi-
sions in a statute such as the Optional Municipal Code. 
C. How to Proceed 
There are at least two distinct measures that should be pursued to 
reduce the confusion about city home rule powers in Washington State. 
Ironically, Professor Trautman made two similar recommendations in his 
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oft-quoted 1963 article, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations 
in Washington.369 First, he suggested that the legislature “protect its pre-
rogatives in relation to municipalities” by making its wishes known 
through statutes.370 The legislature did the major part of that task by en-
acting the Optional Municipal Code four years later. Now, lawmakers 
would do well to review and revise the accreted 125 years of general 
statutes on general city powers371 and first class charter city powers.372 
Much in those statutes could be deleted as unnecessary surplusage be-
cause they purport to grant powers that code cities and first class cities 
already possess under the broad grant of Washington Revised Code 
§ 35A.11.020 and under the broad police power grant of art. XI, section 
10 of the Washington State Constitution. Grants of powers (including 
proprietary powers) that duplicate those broad grants could be deleted 
and replaced with a few carefully drafted but comprehensive summaries 
of city powers. 
Professor Trautman’s second recommendation was directed toward 
the Supreme Court of Washington. He suggested: “It is not too 
late . . . for the court to continue, and to strengthen, its interpretations in 
favor of the powers of . . . cities when doubt exists and in favor of all 
municipal corporations when an issue of potential conflict with state 
statutes arises.”373 In addition to its past recognition of the strong consti-
tutional charter powers of first class cities and strong police powers of all 
cities, it is time for the court to consistently pay attention to the statutes 
providing robust city powers regarding public services. The court should 
follow its own recent advice about how the judiciary and the legislature 
“can work together in harmony and in the spirit of reciprocal deference 
to the other’s important role,”374 follow the solid line of Washington 
opinions giving full credence to city home rule statutes, and treat Dil-
lon’s Rule as “zombie jurisprudence” that needs to remain permanently 
dead. 
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